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TRIUMPH OR TRAGEDY?
THE BANKRUPTCY ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1966
HAROLD MARSH, JR.*
Professor Marsh analyzes in detail the 1966 amendments to the
Bankruptcy Act. Addressing the question whether these amend-
ments have accomplished anything, he concludes that they have
done little but complicate an already intolerably complicated statute.
Although he points out many drafting failures, he particularly
condemns the failure of Congress to ask or answer the underlying
questions of policy-whether tax liens and state statutory liens
should be given priority. Professor Marsh concludes that whatever
good the amendments may do "is not worth the mess they have
made."
"[T]his is about the simplest piece of legislation, and as free from
ambiguities as any bill that has been introduced in the Congress
since I came to the Senate 11 years ago."'
Senator Sam J. Ervin
"In short, Mr. Chairman, it is our sincere belief, it is far from
clear whether the bill has any effect whatsoever."2
Mr. Lawrence M. Stone
Tax Legislative Counsel,
Treasury Department
"I will admit if you start reading all of the sections of the bank-
ruptcy law that you reach a state of great intellectual confusion. ' 3
Senator Sam J. Ervin
After almost ten years of arduous work by the National Bankruptcy
Conference, H.R. 136 and H.R. 3438 were enacted by the Congress
* Professor Law, University of California, Los Angeles; Visiting Professor of
Law, Harvard University, 1966-67. The author wishes to acknowledge the research
assistance of Mr. C. W. Craycroft, third year Harvard Law student, in connection
with the preparation of this article.
'Hearing on S. 976 (H.R. 3438) and S. 1912 (H.R. 136) Before the Senate Com-
inittee on Finance, 89th Cong., 1st Sess, 21 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Hearing].
'Hearing 9.
'Hearing 23.
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and approved by the President July 5, 1966. 4 These bills, containing
the first major revisions of the Bankruptcy Act since 1950-1952, con-
stitute the only significant bills which the Bankruptcy Conference has
been able to persuade Congress to adopt in that period of time, albeit
with various amendments made at the insistence of the Treasury De-
partment. An analysis of these measures is not only intrinsically im-
portant in view of their possible impact upon bankruptcy law and
administration, but also interesting as a gauge of the feasibility of
obtaining major improvements in this area of the law.
These above mentioned bills amend sections 1, 2, 17a, 64a, 67b, 67c
and 70c of the Bankruptcy Act. The amendments are primarily re-
lated to tax claims and tax liens in bankruptcy proceedings, although
they importantly affect other matters. To a large extent they were sold
to Congress on the basis that they would significantly reduce the
enormous impact of tax claims, particularly federal tax claims, upon
the distribution of a bankrupt's estate, thus benefiting the general
unsecured creditors.' They were supported by various organizations
of such creditors, including the National Association of Credit Manage-
ment and the American Bankers Association,6 and vigorously opposed
by the Treasury Department.
The following analysis of these amendments is an attempt to deter-
mine whether in fact the hopes of their sponsors have been realized or
whether the amendments will have "any effect whatsoever."
I. PRIORITY OF TAX CLAIMS
All unsecured tax claims, state and federal, have heretofore been
granted an unlimited priority by section 64a of the Bankruptcy Act
on the fourth rung of a five-rung ladder of priority. The first three
rungs granted priority to administrative expenses, wage claims lim-
ited as provided in section 64a(2), and the expenses of a creditor in
obtaining the refusal or revocation of a discharge or the conviction
of the debtor of a bankruptcy crime (a relatively unimportant pri-
ority). Tax liens, not invalidated or subordinated by some provision
of the Bankruptcy Act, were entitled to payment (along with other
'As 80 Stat. 268 (1966), 11 USC § 1 (Supp. 1966), and 80 Stat. 270 (1966), 11 USC
§ 11 (Supp. 1966).
'H.R. REP. No. 687, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1965); S. REP. No. 114, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess. 4, 16-17 (1965) ; Hearing 21, 27, 43-44, 46, 48, 56.
'Hearing 45, 56.
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secured claims in the order of their priority) 7 before anything could
be paid to the various section 64a priorities.
Section 64a as amended in 1966 grants priority only to those taxes
"which are not released by a discharge," thus incorporating the
amended provisions of section 17a purporting to discharge certain
taxes in bankruptcy. Section 17a provides that a discharge in bank-
ruptcy releases the bankrupt from all of his provable debts, except six
categories of such debts, one of which has heretofore been all taxes.
The new section 17a(1), however, excludes from the effect of dis-
charge only:
taxes which became legally due and owing by the bankrupt to the United
States or to any State or any subdivision thereof within three years
preceding bankruptcy: Provided, however, That a discharge in bank-
ruptcy shall not release a bankrupt from any taxes (a) which were not
assessed in any case in which the bankrupt failed to make a return re-
quired by law, (b) which were assessed within one year preceding
bankruptcy in any case in which the bankrupt failed to make a return
required by law, (c) which were not reported on a return made by the
bankrupt and which were not assessed prior to bankruptcy by reason of
a prohibition on assessment pending the exhaustion of administrative
or judicial remedies available to the bankrupt, (d) with respect to
which the bankrupt made a false or fraudulent return, or willfully at-
tempted in any manner to evade or defeat, or (e) which the bankrupt
has collected or withheld from others as required by the laws of the
United States or any State or political subdivision thereof, but has not
paid over; but a discharge shall not be a bar to any remedies available
under applicable law to the United States or to any State or any sub-
division thereof, against the exemption of the bankrupt allowed by law
and duly set apart to him under this Act: And provided further, That
a discharge in bankruptcy shall not release or affect any tax lien.
What tax claims are denied priority by these provisions? We are
concerned at this point only with the effect of this language as incor-
porated in section 64a. Strangely enough, although the language is
necessarily identical in sections 64a and 17a (since it is merely in-
corporated by reference from one to the other), its effect as it relates
to discharge (considered later in this article) may be quite different
from its effect as it relates to priority.
Since there are a myriad of taxes, state and federal, it is difficult to
discuss these new provisions in the abstract. However, almost all ad
'See Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, 80 Stat. 1125 (1966), U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 4572 (1966).
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valorem taxes are secured by liens on the property assessed, and the
provisions do not purport to release any tax lien. It is conceivable that
in some circumstances the amount of arrears in such a tax might exceed
the amount realizable upon a sale of the property and be a personal
liability of the owner, thus leaving an unsecured balance to claim
priority. However, the Bankruptcy Act provides that "no order shall
be made for the payment of a tax assessed against any property of the
bankrupt in excess of the value of the interest of the bankrupt estate
therein... 2" Hence, the new provisions will presumably have no
effect on ad valorem taxes.
The impact, if any, of the new provisions will relate primarily to
various types of internal revenue taxes, such as income taxes, sales
taxes, estate and gift taxes. It is of course impossible in the space
available here to review the tax laws of the fifty states and federal
government relating to each of these different types of taxes. However,
there can be no doubt that the primary concern of the sponsors of the
amendment, and of the Treasury Department in its consideration of it,
was directed to the federal income and withholding taxes, which cause
the major depletion of the assets of a bankrupt estate. Therefore, the
application of the new provisions can be illustrated by considering
their relationship to these federal taxes.
The amendment purports to exclude from priority status only those
taxes which "became legally due and owing" three years or more prior
to the date of bankruptcy. The date of bankruptcy is by specific
definition the date of filing the petition.' When do income taxes "be-
come due and owing" within the meaning of this provision? Section
6151 of the Internal Revenue Code [hereinafter called IRC] provides
that a person required to file a return of tax "shall pay such tax at the
time and place fixed for filing the return (determined without regard
to any extension of time for filing the return)." Therefore, it would
seem at first glance that income taxes would become "due and owing"
'Bankruptcy Act § 64a(4), 30 Stat. 563 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 104 (1964).
This provision has been said not to affect any valid tax lien. 3 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY
II 64.403, 64.406, at 2179 (14th ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as COLLIER]. In itself, no
exception can be taken to this statement. However, it has recently been interpreted to
mean that an ad valorem tax which by the filing of a certificate can be made a general
lien on all the property of the taxpayer (not merely the property subject to the tax) is
unaffected by this proviso. Poly Indus., Inc. v. Mozley, 362 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1966).
This construction seems to be erroneous (although the result of the case is supportable
on another ground also relied upon by the court) and to frustrate the policy of this
provision. Even if correct, however, it does not alter the statement that the new §
64a(4) will have no effect on such taxes, since it also does not affect any lien.
'Bankruptcy Act § 1(13), 30 Stat. 544 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
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at the date the return is due (normally March 15 for corporations and
April 15 for individuals on a calendar year basis, of the year following
the tax year).0 However, the apparent simplicity of this answer is
disturbed by three factors.
The first is the effect of the pay-as-you-go provisions applicable to
certain individuals and corporations." Such individuals and corpora-
tions are required to file declarations of estimated tax and to pay such
tax in installments during the taxable year, with the final installment in
the case of individuals payable on January 15 of the succeeding tax-
able year.12 Suppose that an individual subject to these provisions
filed a declaration of estimated tax for the calendar year 1963, but did
not pay any of the tax on the due dates for the installments; on April
15, 1964, the person filed a tax return showing a total tax due equal
to or less than the amount shown on the declaration of estimated tax,
but also did not pay any of this amount. On February 15, 1967, the
individual files a petition in bankruptcy, and the tax is still owing. Did
it become "due and owing" more than or less than three years prior to
the date of bankruptcy?
There is nothing in the legislative history which is helpful in an-
swering this question. Probably the answer will turn upon whether the
estimated tax is considered to be a separate tax which is credited on
the income tax payable at the due date of the return for the taxable
year, or is considered to be a required payment, at an earlier date, of
what is essentially the same tax. It is believed that the basic income
tax should be considered "due and owing" at the due date of the
return, and the estimated tax a separate tax, under the provisions of
the IRC.'3 However, the question is not free from doubt.
The second factor preventing a clear answer to the question when
" INr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6072 [hereinafter cited as IRE].
"IRC §§6015-16. In general, an individual is required to file a declaration of
estimated tax if his gross income can reasonably be expected to exceed $5,000 (or
$10,000 in the case of a married couple filing a joint return) or to include more than
$200 from sources other than wages. A corporation is required to file such declaration
if its income tax can reasonably be expected to exceed $100,000.
' IRC §§ 6153-54. For fiscal years beginning after 1966, corporations will be re-
quired to pay the full amount of such estimated tax in four equal installments during
the year. (Previously, only 74% of the estimated tax was required to be paid.)
' IRC § 6315 provides that payment of the "estimated income tax, or any install-
ment thereof, shall be considered payment on account of the income taxes imposed by
subtitle A for the taxable year." This seems to indicate that the estimated tax is a
separate tax which is merely credited on the income tax. And while there are penal-
ties for not paying the estimated tax (IRC §§ 6654-55), IRC § 6201(b) provides that
"No unpaid amount of estimated tax under § 6153 or § 6154 shall be assessed" and
under IRC § 6601(i) no interest is charged on underpayments. As a practical matter,
of course, it has to be recognized that the estimated tax is merely a required prepay-
ment of the income tax.
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income taxes become due and owing is the existence of procedures for
contesting an asserted deficiency in the tax reported and the prohibi-
tion upon the collection of a deficiency (other than by a jeopardy as-
sessment) until these procedures have been exhausted. If the Internal
Revenue Service asserts that there is a tax due in addition to that re-
ported on the return as filed, it is normally prohibited from assessing or
collecting the asserted deficiency until it has sent the ninety-day letter
provided by IRC section 6212 and until the ninety-day period has
elapsed without any petition being filed with the Tax Court, or if such
a petition is filed until the decision of the Tax Court has become final.14
IRC section 6151 provides as the "general rule" that "such tax" is
payable at the time and place fixed for filing the return. On the other
hand, IRC sections 6213 and 6215 provide that in the case of a defi-
ciency determination which has become final by the elapse of the ninety
days or by a decision of the Tax Court, the deficiency "shall be paid
upon notice and demand from the Secretary or his delegate."
Will such a deficiency be treated as "due and owing" for the pur-
poses of section 64a of the Bankruptcy Act at the due date of the
original return or only upon a final determination of the amount of
the deficiency under the above provisions? The fact that interest is
payable upon the amount of the deficiency as finally determined from
the due date of the original return 5 suggests that the amount was "due
and owing" at that time. On the other hand, the fact that assessment
and collection of the deficiency is normally prohibited pending the
exhaustion of the administrative and judicial remedies and the fact
that the amount of the deficiency actually payable in a contested case
is not known until a compromise settlement or a final decision of the
Tax Court argues that it is not "due and owing" until those processes
are completed. The existence of the possibility of a jeopardy assess-
ment which can shortcut these procedures, of course, weakens the
latter argument. It would seem that the stronger argument supports
treating such a deficiency as "due and owing" at the due date of the
return, but doubtless extensive litigation will be required to obtain a
final answer to this question.
The third factor which complicates the question when income taxes
, IRC § 6213. The ninety days is extended to 150 days in a case where the notice
of deficiency is "addressed to a person outside the States of the Union and the Dis-
trict of Columbia." The jeopardy assessment authority is provided by IRC § 6861 in
cases where the Secretary or his delegate believes that the assessment or collection of
a deficiency "will be jeopardized by delay."
IRC § 6601.
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become "due and owing" is the existence of provisions for installment
payments and extensions of time for payment. IRC section 6152 pro-
vides that a corporation may elect to pay its income tax in two equal
installments, the first of which shall be paid at the time of the return
and the second three months later. If a corporation makes such an
election and then files a petition in bankruptcy three years and one
month after the due date of the return, would the second installment
have become "due and owing" more or less than three years prior to
the date of bankruptcy? Also, the Secretary or his delegate may under
various circumstances extend the time for the payment of a tax or of
an amount determined as a deficiency for varying periods of time. 6
Where such an extension has been granted, did the tax become "due
and owing" at the original due date or at the extended date agreed to
by the Secretary or his delegate, for the purposes of section 64a?
If the extension of time for payment is granted before the date when
the tax would otherwise become due, a plausible argument can be made
that it never became "due and owing" on the earlier date but only at
the extended date. Of course, in the case of a deficiency, this conclu-
sion would depend in part upon how the earlier question in answered
as to whether such deficiency ordinarily would become "due and
owing" at the time the return is due or only when the amount of the
deficiency becomes final. If the former is selected, then it is hard to
see how an extension of time for payment granted after the determina-
tion could change that date, unless it is said that the tax became "due
and owing" at two separate and distinct times. If the conclusion last
suggested should be reached, the question would arise as to which of
the events started the three-year period running, or whether a second
three-year period started running when the tax became due and owing
a second time.
As to an election of installment payments of the tax which is en-
tirely within the choice of the taxpayer, the conclusion would seem
clear that the deferred installment would only become "due and owing"
at the time fixed for its payment.
' IRC § 6161 provides that the Secretary or his delegate may extend the time for
payment of any tax for a reasonable period not to exceed six months (or longer in the
case of a taxpayer who is abroad), and may extend the time for the payment of an
amount determined as a deficiency in income tax for a period not to exceed eighteen
months (and, "in exceptional cases," for a further period not to exceed twelve months).
Other sections provide for extensions in special situations: § 6162 (payment of tax
on gain attributable to liquidation of personal holding companies); § 6164 (payment
of taxes by corporations expecting carrybacks) ; § 6167 (payment of tax attributable to
recovery of foreign expropriation losses). There are also other sections relating to
extension of time for payment of estate and gift taxes.
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It can be seen that determining what income taxes became due and
owing within three years prior to bankruptcy is far from simple.
However, as we shall see, under the provisos in this section there are
few taxes denied priority in any event, whether they are more or less
than three years old, so that the ambiguity in this clause is not as
serious as it might otherwise be.
If we are able to determine that a particular tax became due and
owing more than three years prior to bankruptcy, under what cir-
cumstances will it be denied priority? There are logically only three
circumstances in which an income tax17 can be due the United States
Government: (1) if a return is filed showing the correct tax, but all or
part of the tax shown is not paid; (2) if no return is filed; or (3) if a
return is filed not showing the correct tax, and an additional amount is
due as a deficiency. There might also be some combination of these
three sets of circumstances, as for example where part or all of the
tax shown is not paid and there is an understatement of the tax on the
return so that a deficiency is also due.
The most important provision in the amendment in relation to the
first situation posed is the last proviso which states that it shall not
"release or affect any tax lien." Under IRC sections 6321 and 6322,
if any person liable for any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same
after demand, a tax lien arises upon all his property and rights to
property as of the time of the assessment.ls Under IRC section 6201
an assessment is made automatically and immediately of all taxes
'
7 We are considering here the basic income tax only. For a complete treatment,
it would also be necessary to deal with additions to tax, penalties, interest, transferee
liability, and possibly other liabilities of a taxpayer. For example, would a penalty
or an addition to tax become "due and owing" only at the time it is assessed or prior
thereto when the facts occurred giving rise to the liability for the penalty or addi-
tion? With respect to priority, the question regarding penalties is not important
since penalties are not allowable. Simonson v. Granquist, 369 U.S. 38 (1962). How-
ever, in the course of these bills winding their way through Congress for ten years, a
provision that penalties are non-dischargeable was for some reason dropped. There-
fore, a question may arise as to whether a penalty which has been due and owing for
more than three years may be discharged, if it is treated as a part of the "tax" under
Bankruptcy Act § 17a(1). (There is some authority that all penalties are discharged,
because they are provable but not allowable, United States v. Mighell, 273 F.2d 682(10th Cir. 1959), but this position is based upon the argument that "They are not
taxes and their assimilation with taxes for lien purposes does not make them taxes."
Id. at 685. But cf. Bruning v. United States, 376 U.S. 358 (1964)).
However, we probably have enough difficulty for present purposes in deciding when
the basic income tax becomes "due and owing," without going into these peripheral
matters.
'Although the lien does not arise until a demand is made, it relates back to the
time of the assessment. IRC §§ 6321-22. And the demand may be made even after the
date of bankruptcy. In re Fidelity Tube Corp., 278 F.2d 776 (3rd. Cir.), cert. denied
sub non. Borough of East Newark v. United States, 364 U.S. 828 (1960) ; Brust v.
Sturr, 237 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1956). Therefore, we may treat the lien for practical
[ VOL. 42: 681
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shown on a return filed. Therefore, subject to the qualification in the
next paragraph, all income taxes which have been correctly reported on
a return, no matter how old, are still entitled to priority if they are
still collectible by the government. Of course, under the previous law
if the tax was no longer collectible by the Government, it was not
allowable (much less entitled to priority).
Under the Supreme Court's Speers 9 decision (and the recent amend-
ment to section 70c confirming it, discussed below), a tax lien as to
which a notice has not been filed under IRC section 6323 is invalid
against a trustee in bankruptcy, who has the status of a "judgment
creditor." Formerly, the only consequence of such invalidation was to
demote the tax claim from the super priority of a secured debt to the
fourth rung of section 64a's priority ladder, still ahead of all general
unsecured creditors. Under the amendment to section 64a if (a) a tax
became due and owing more than three years prior to bankruptcy, and
(b) the tax has been assessed so that a lien arises, and (c) no notice
has been filed under IRC section 6323, the lien will be invalid, and the
tax claim will fall into the general unsecured category, since it is now
denied priority status under section 64a(4).
Where the bankrupt failed to make a return required by law, pro-
viso (a) to the amendment excludes from the three-year cut-off and
grants priority to taxes which have not been assessed at the date of
bankruptcy; proviso (b) similarly excludes any taxes "which were
assessed within one year preceding bankruptcy in any case in which the
bankrupt failed to make a return required by law." These provisions
seem to deny priority to any tax claim (1) which became due and
owing more than three years prior to bankruptcy, (2) as to which no
return was filed, and (3) which was assessed more than one year prior
to bankruptcy. However, this is erroneous. If the tax has been assessed
(whether more or less than one year prior to bankrupty) a lien arises,
which is not released or affected by the amendment. Thus, a fourth
condition must be added: (4) as to which no notice has been filed under
IRC section 6323.
The deficiency arising where a return is filed but the full tax is not
reported may result either from a good faith error 20 or from "fraud"
purposes as arising at the date of assessment. (Note, however, that these cases have
been overruled with respect to the effect in bankruptcy of the non-filing of the notice
under IRC § 6323. See note 19 infra.)
2 United States v. Speers, 382 U.S. 266 (1965).
A good faith error for this purpose may involve negligence or even an inten-
tional disregard of the rules and regulations (but without intent to defraud). While
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
(in the words of IRC section 6501(c) a "false or fraudulent return
with intent to evade tax" or "a willful attempt in any manner to defeat
or evade tax").
In the former case there is normally a three-year limitation upon
assessment of the deficiency computed from the time "the return was
filed,' but running of the period is suspended from the issuance of
the ninety-day letter until a final decision by the Tax Court, and for
sixty days thereafter.22 In the case of a fraudulent return there is no
period of limitation upon assessment.23
If the deficiency arose from a fraudulent return, the tax claim is
not in any event denied priority, regardless of its age, under the pro-
visions of the amendment. Proviso (d) of the amendment excludes
from the three-year cut-off any tax "with respect to which the bankrupt
made a false or fraudulent return, or willfully attempted in any manner
to evade or defeat." This provision applies regardless of whether the
tax has been assessed and regardless of whether any resulting lien is
vulnerable under section 70c.
If the deficiency arose from a non-fraudulent return, and the Gov-
ernment has taken no steps to assess or collect it, or to secure a waiver
of the statute of limitations, a tax claim which has been due for more
than three years is generally not collectible and would not have been
provable in bankruptcy even before the amendment. IRC section
6501 imposes a three-year limitation upon the assessment of any such
income tax (which in practical effect means upon the issuance of the
ninety-day letter, since that tolls the running of the statute). There
are two exceptions to this general statement.
The first arises from the fact that the three-year period in IRC
section 6501 runs from the date of the actual filing of the return,
whether or not on the normal due date. Therefore, if an extension of
time was obtained in which to file the return, and if bankruptcy occurs
more than three years after the due date of the return but less than
three years after its actual filing, such a tax claim would still be
provable in bankruptcy. The second exception arises from the fact
that under IRC section 6501(e) a six-year statute of limitations
there is a penalty for such negligence or intentional disregard under IRC § 6653(a),
they do not affect the statute of limitations and are not distinguished from other
errors by the new provisions of Bankruptcy Act §§ 17a(1) and 64a(4).
IRC § 6501(a).
IRC § 6503 (a).
IRC § 6501(c). There is also no statute of limitations in the case of failure to
file a return, but that situation is specifically dealt with in the new § 64a(4) of the
Bankruptcy Act.
[ VOL. 42: 681
BANKRUPTCY ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1966
(rather than a three-year statute) is provided in a case where the
taxpayer omits in excess of twenty-five per cent of his gross income
from the return. Therefore, a deficiency claim in that case would still
be provable so long as the date of filing of the return was not more
than six years prior to the date of bankruptcy.
The more important situations involving open years extending back
more than three years prior to bankruptcy are those where the Gov-
ernment has obtained waivers of the statute of limitations and pos-
sibly taken some steps to determine and assess a deficiency. Such ac-
tion may involve any, or frequently all, of the following, in chronologi-
cal order:
(a) obtaining waivers of the statute of limitations from the tax-
payer to permit the audit to be made or completed and the other
procedures to be pursued after the expiration of the three-year
period;
24
(b) audit of the return;
(c) informal conferences of the taxpayer with the agent and his
group chief;
(d) issuance of the thirty-day letter;m
(e) the district conference procedure with a conferee in the Dis-
trict Director's office other than the group chief;26
(f) a proceeding before the Appellate Division in the Regional
Office; 27
(g) issuance of the ninety-day letter;28
(h) a petition to the Tax Court; 29
(i) final decision of the Tax Court which is not appealed or the
final decision on appeal;
(j) assessment of the tax deficiency as finally determined.
Of course, these procedures may be short-circuited at any time by
either a compromise settlement and resulting consent to assessment of
the figure agreed upon or by making a jeopardy assessment.
-' IRC § 6501 (c) (4).
" Treas. Reg. § 601.105(d) (1). Formerly, the conference procedure in the District
Director's office, if requested by the taxpayer, normally preceded the issuance of the
30-day letter and the written Protest in response thereto. However, this was changed
by Rev. Proc. 64-38, 1964-2 Cum BULL. 965. Under the present procedure, the 30-day
letter is issued and generally a written Protest must be filed in order to obtain a dis-
trict conference.
- Treas. Reg. § 601.105(c).
Treas. Reg. § 601.106.
IRC § 6212.
IRC § 6213.
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What tax deficiency claims involved in some stage of this process will
be denied priority under the provisions of amended section 64a? The
answer seems to be none, or almost none. Proviso (c) excludes from
the three-year cut-off taxes "which were not reported on a return
made by the bankrupt and which were not assessed prior to bank-
ruptcy by reason of a prohibition on assessment pending the exhaustion
of administrative or judicial remedies available to the bankrupt." This
language obviously refers to IRC section 6213 (a) which generally
prohibits assessment (other than a jeopardy assessment) "until such
notice [the ninety-day letter] has been mailed to the taxpayer ....
[and] until the expiration of such ninety-day period... [and], if a
petition has been filed with the Tax Court, until the decision of the Tax
Court has become final."30 Therefore, assessment is presumably pro-
hibited within the meaning of section 64a at all stages of these pro-
ceedings.3
It could be argued that the language of the proviso, "pending the
exhaustion of administrative ... remedies," means that such remedies
must be "pending" at the date of bankruptcy for the proviso to apply,
and therefore the thirty-day letter, or perhaps the ninety-day letter,
must have been issued before the petition in bankruptcy was filed.
However, it should be noted that the proviso does not refer to "pending
administrative remedies"; it says "pending the exhaustion of admin-
istrative remedies." These remedies are as available to a taxpayer who
has merely signed a waiver permitting later audit and determination of
a deficiency as to one who has received a thirty-day letter. 2 And IRC
section 6213 equally prohibits assessment at any time prior to the is-
suance of the ninety-day letter, as well as thereafter while further rem-
edies are being pursued. Furthermore, this interpretation would sug-
gest that income tax claims for periods eight, nine or ten years in the
past would still be entitled to priority if the thirty-day letter or the
" The period for filing the petition with the Tax Court is 150 days if the notice
of deficiency "is addressed to a person outside the States of the Union and the Dis-
trict of Columbia." IRC § 6213 (a).
"' The reference to a prohibition on assessment cannot, of course, mean a total
prohibition, since the possibility of a jeopardy assessment under IRC § 6861 always
exists; such a construction would make the proviso meaningless.
-While the 30-day letter is not a statutory requirement, it does mark a point at
which some additional formality is introduced into the administrative proceedings;
and it could be argued that administrative "remedies" were not "pending" before its
issuance. On the other hand, if the 90-day letter should be selected as the dividing
line, this would exclude not only the district conference but also the "appeal" to the
Appellate Division as being "administrative remedies," leaving only the appeal to
the Tax Court. While the Tax Court may be an administrative court, it is a court;
and the proceedings before it would seem to be more in the nature of "judicial" than
administrative-remedies,
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ninety-day letter had gone out the day before the filing of the petition
in bankruptcy; but a claim for the same years would be denied priority
if the audit had been completed and informal conferences held, but the
thirty-day letter (or the ninety-day letter) did not issue until the day
after the bankruptcy petition was filed.
It similarly would be possible to argue that any given point in this
process (obtaining waivers of the statute of limitations, beginning the
audit, completion of the audit, the agent's preliminary report, confer-
ences with the group chief, the district conference procedure, etc.) was
the point at which administrative proceedings became "pending" with-
in the meaning of section 64a. The fact that there is no obvious reason
to select any one of these over the others, and the fact that IRC
section 6213 indiscriminately prohibits assessment whether any or none
or these steps have been taken (so long as the taxable year is still
open), argues very strongly for the conclusion that proviso (c) grants
priority to any tax deficiency claim which has not been finally deter-
mined, if it is still assessable.
There is one situation in which the amendment does seem to deny
priority to a deficiency claim more than three years old. That is where
the prohibition on assessment has lifted but no assessment has been
made and the statute of limitations has not run. The government is
given sixty days after the expiration of the ninety-day period or after
the final decision of the Tax Court in which to make an assessment.3 3
However, until the assessment it has no lien. Therefore, if the petition
in bankruptcy is filed three days after a final decision of the Tax Court
but the assessment is not made until six days after the decision, the
government would not have any lien recognizable in bankruptcy and its
claim would be denied priority, if the claim became "due and owing"
more than three years before bankruptcy, because at the date of bank-
ruptcy there was no longer any prohibition on assessment. While this
result may seem irrational, there appears to be no escape from it under
the terms of the amendment.34
Another situation in which the Government's claim for a deficiency
would be denied priority is where an assessment is made after the
conclusion of all these procedures, but no notice is filed prior to the
date of bankruptcy. In that case the lien would be invalidated under
section 70c and the claim would not be entitled to priority if it became
"due and owing" more than three years prior to bankruptcy.
'IRC § 6503 (a).
" See S. REP. No. 999, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1966).
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The result of these irrationalities may be that a court will say that a
deficiency does not in any case become "due and owing" until it is
assessed or at least finally determinedf 5 That this interpretation would
make proviso (c) meaningless may perhaps be thought the lesser of
two evils.
Finally, the amendment in proviso (e) makes the three-year cut-off
inapplicable and grants priority to all taxes "which the bankrupt has
collected or withheld from others as required by the laws of the United
States or any state or political subdivision thereof, but has not paid
over." It is a common phenomenon of business failure that even an
"honest" businessman, in attempting to salvage a business which ap-
pears headed for insolvency, will frequently "borrow" money of other
people without their consent if he can get his hands on it. The one
fund which he is almost always able to lay his hands on is the taxes he
has withheld and is currently withholding from his employees for the
Government. In those cases where the Government has been able to
trace such funds, they have been treated as a trust fund held for the
Government to which it has the sole claim." In the more usual case
where the funds have been dissipated and are not traceable, the Gov-
ernment has either the super priority of a secured debt where the tax
has been assessed or, in any event, the fourth priority of a tax claim.37
Since the Government's claim comes in all cases before all general un-
secured creditors, it has been in many cases the major cause of the
depletion of a bankrupt estate, which results in general creditors re-
ceiving little or nothing.
This situation will remain completely unchanged under the amend-
ment to section 64a. It is doubtful if the proviso really means anything
in this connection, since it is hardly conceivable that the Government
would permit an employer to continue failing to remit his withholding
taxes for more than three years before it takes some steps against him
which precipitate bankruptcy. But even in the highly unusual case
where this might happen, the priority of the Government is still pre-
served.
To return to our original question, what federal income tax claims
' The Senate Finance Committee proposed that the term "date of assessment" be
substituted for "legally due and owing" in the bill. It stated that "while perhaps the
courts would interpret the term 'legally due and owing' as meaning the 'date of assess-
ment' a question of this importance should not be left in doubt." S. REP. No. 999, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1966). However, Congress rejected this amendment; and it seems
doubtful if a court will itself make the substitution, except perhaps out of frustration.
,a IRC § 7501 ; 4 COLLIER 259, 273-74.
IRC §§ 3403, 7501; 3 COLLIER 2163-74.
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will be denied priority under this "simple" amendment to section 64a?
While as indicated above the interpretation of a number of its pro-
visions is highly uncertain, based upon our conclusions as to the most
reasonable interpretations the following claims would seem to be de-
nied priority:
I. Deficiency claims:
A. Arising out of a "fraudulent" return: none.
B. Arising out of a non-fraudulent return:
If a deficiency claim is considered to become due and owing
at the due date for the return and a prohibition on assess-
ment "pending the exhaustion of administrative remedies"
within the meaning of section 64a is considered to exist at all
times prior to the issuance of the ninety-day letter-only
those claims with respect to which (a) the due date of the
return was more than three years prior to bankruptcy, (b)
the ninety-day letter was issued and the ninety days elapsed
without petition to the Tax Court or the decision of such
court became final prior to bankruptcy, and (c) either (i)
the bankruptcy petition was filed within sixty days after the
elapse of the ninety days or after a final decision but prior
to the assessment or (ii) the assessment was made but no
notice was filed under IRC section 6323 prior to bankruptcy.
II. Claims where no return was filed:
Those claims with respect to which (a) the return was due more
than three years prior to bankruptcy, (b) the assessment was
made more than one year prior to bankruptcy and (c) no notice
was filed prior to bankruptcy under IRC section 6323.
III. Claims where a return was filed reporting the correct tax which
was not paid in whole or in part:
A. If no extension of time for payment was granted and install-
ment payments were not elected or were not permissible,
those claims with respect to which (a) the due date of the
return was more than three years prior to bankruptcy, and
(b) no notice was filed prior to bankruptcy under IRC
section 6323.
B. If extension of time for payment was granted or installment
payments were validly elected:
If such extended or installment payments are considered to
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become due and owing only at the extended or deferred
date-those claims with respect to which (a) such extended
or deferred date was more than three years prior to bank-
ruptcy, and (b) no notice was filed prior to bankruptcy
under IRC section 6323.
An examination of this outline will reveal that, if a prohibition on
assessment within the meaning of section 64a is considered to exist at
all times prior to the issuance of the ninety-day letter and until final
determination of a deficiency (which is the most probable interpreta-
tion, since that is specifically what IRC section 6213 says), no federal
income tax claims whatever will be denied priority under the amended
section 64a except (1) those which have been assessed prior to bank-
ruptcy but with respect to which no notice has been filed, under various
circumstances; and (2) those with respect to which a prohibition on
assessment has expired upon the elapse of ninety days after the issu-
ance of the ninety-day letter without petition to the Tax Court or upon
final decision of the Tax Court, and the bankruptcy petition is filed
within sixty days thereafter, before the actual assessment is made. If
the Internal Revenue Service should adopt a policy of sending a de-
mand and filing a notice of tax lien simultaneously with the assessment
in every case where the assessment relates to a taxable year which
ended more than three years before the assessment, the first group
could be eliminated."' If it adopts a policy of speeding up its assess-
ment procedures after the termination of a prohibition on assessment
and of utilizing to a greater extent the jeopardy assessment during the
ninety-day period and during the course of a Tax Court case, the
second group may be reduced to insignificance.
'This would not be as great an administrative problem as the Treasury attempted
to convince the Senate it would. The Senate Finance Committee Report stated that
there were 2.4 million delinquent Federal tax accounts for the fiscal year ended June
30, 1965, and only 220,000 notices of lien filed. S. REP. No. 999, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
4 (1966). It might of course be impossible to file 2.4 million notices of lien. However,
undoubtedly the vast majority of these delinquencies were current delinquencies, and
not deficiency assessments relating to years more than three years in the past; and
the same report points out that four-fifths of them were collected in the first year after
assessment. So long as the tax did not become "due and owing" more than three years
in the past, the only result in bankruptcy of a failure to file the notice would be to
push the Government down to priority 4, and it would in any event be pushed down to
priority 2% by § 67c with respect to all personal property not accompanied by posses-
sion. Therefore, while the result may be unpalatable to the Treasury, this is not as
serious a problem as the Treasury tried to make it out. On the other hand, it would
be a more serious detriment to the Treasury if it were to lose its priority entirely as
a result of the invalidation of the lien; and it seems reasonable to assume that the
number of such cases would be entirely manageable if the Treasury wants to take
steps to avoid this result.
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It thus appears probable that this amendment may result in causing
harrassment and financial embarrassment to taxpayers in many cases
in which they might otherwise arrange an accommodation with the
government.3 9 Filing notice of a tax lien, and certainly making a
jeopardy assessment, are actions which frequently precipitate bank-
ruptcy where otherwise the delinquent taxpayer might be able to work
his way out of a difficult situation.40 As the end result, general un-
secured creditors will not receive any more in bankruptcy liquidations,
since, if the Government does in fact adopt these policies, it will pre-
serve its priority in virtually all cases.4 '
II. INVALMATION oF TAx Li:ENS
A. Section 70c
Section 70c of the Bankruptcy Act has provided that the trustee in
bankruptcy has the rights of a creditor holding a "lien by legal or
equitable proceedings" as of the date of bankruptcy upon all property
upon which a creditor of the bankrupt could have obtained such a lien,
whether or not such a creditor exists. This section has been one of
the major weapons in the arsenal of the trustee for the purpose of in-
validating imperfect liens and transfers which are vulnerable to a lien
creditor under state law. IRC section 6323 has provided that a fed-
eral tax lien as to which no notice has been filed as prescribed "shall not
be valid" as against, among others, a "judgment creditor." The ma-
jority of the court of appeals decisions considering the problem had
held that the trustee in bankruptcy was not a "judgment creditor"
'See H.R. REp. No. 686, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1965) (Letter From Stanley S.
Surrey, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury); S. REP. No. 999, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
5 (1966) (Letter From Henry H. Fowler, Secretary of the Treasury); Hearing 8
(Testimony of Lawrence M. Stone, Tax Legislative Counsel, Treasury Department).
See S. REP. No. 999, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1966).
"It may be suggested that the Government will not adopt policies which may be
harmful to many taxpayers, but will stoically accept its relegation to an unsecured,
non-priority position in some situations. Anyone who has observed the conduct of
the Internal Revenue Service in connection with tax claims in insolvency liquida-
tions will not view this as a very likely occurence. Furthermore, the irrationality of
the few instances where a tax claim is denied priority is a persuasive argument that
the Government should not accept subordination in those cases if it can be avoided.
For example, an income tax claim relating to a taxable year 10 years prior to bank-
ruptcy will be entitled to priority if a Tax Court case is still pending regarding it
at the date of bankruptcy or if the Tax Court case has been concluded and the assess-
ment has been made and notice filed; but the same claim relating to the same year will
be denied priority if the Tax Court case has been concluded but the assessment not yet
made or if such case has been concluded and the assessment made but no notice filed-
without regard in any case to how dilatory the Government may have been in making
the audit.
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under IRC section 6323 on the ground that that section required an
actual, not merely a "hypothetical," judgment creditor.42
Section 70c as amended in 1966 now provides that the trustee in
bankruptcy has the rights of "a creditor who obtained a judgment
against the bankrupt upon the date of bankruptcy, whether or not such
a creditor exists," as well as the rights of a creditor holding a lien by
legal or equitable proceedings.43 This amendment was intended to
overrule those decisions holding that an unfiled federal tax lien was
nevertheless valid against the trustee. It should be noted, however,
that literally the amendment does nothing. No one denied that the
trustee had the "rights" of a judgment creditor holding a lien on prop-
erty of the bankrupt under the previous language. What those deci-
sions had said was that it was not enough for a person to have the
rights of a judgment creditor in order to qualify under IRC section
6323; he had to be a judgment creditor. Also, the Federal Tax Lien
Act of 1966, 1 enacted later in the same session of Congress, changed
the phrase "judgment creditor" in IRC section 6323 to "judgment
lien creditor," thus frustrating even the effort to have the same phrase
in the two statutes.
However, while the bill containing this amendment was pending in
'In re Fidelity Tube Corp., 278 F.2d 776 (3rd Cir.) cert. denied, 364 U.S. 828
(1960); Brust v. Sturr, 237 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1956); United States v. England, 226
F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1955) ; see In re Taylorcraft Aviation Corp., 168 F.2d 808, 810 (6th
Cir. 1948).
'The amendment also restored and revised a provision which was in § 70c prior
to 1950; and the section now gives the trustee the additional status of "a creditor who
upon the date of bankruptcy obtained an execution returned unsatisfied against the
bankrupt, whether or not such a creditor exists."
There may be obligations enforceable by creditors which are not enforceable by the
debtor himself, and which therefore do not pass to the trustee under § 70a. For ex-
ample, the liability of the holders of watered stock of a corporation is in this cate-
gory in many states. BAILANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 353 (rev. ed. 1946). And since it
is merely an obligation, there is nothing to which a "lien" can attach. Even prior to
1950 it had been held that the trustee could not enforce such an obligation, because the
provision as it then read gave him the status of a judgment creditor with execution
returned n.b. only as to "all other property" [i.e., other than that in the possession or
control of the bankrupt]. In this situation there is no "property" involved.
Under the revised language in the 1966 amendment restoring this provision all
reference to property has been eliminated, and the trustee will succeed directly to the
rights of the creditors as well as the rights of the bankrupt. This effect of this
amendment is more important than that pointed out in the Congressional reports,
namely, that the trustee will also be able to use discovery procedures in State courts
where these are available only to a judgment creditor with execution returned n.b.
H.R. REP. No. 686, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1965).
"80 Stat. 1125 (1966). 1966 U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. Naws. 4572 (1966).
Of course, no amount of language in the Bankruptcy Act can make the trustee ajudgment creditor (or judgment lien creditor). If the question were still in doubt, it
would have been preferable simply to insert the phrase "trustee in bankruptcy" in
IRC § 6323 as one of those persons against whom an unfiled federal tax lien is
invalid.
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Congress the Supreme Court made it unnecessary by the decision in
United States v. Speers,46 which held that the trustee in bankruptcy
was a "judgment creditor" within the meaning of IRC section 6323
under the previous language. Therefore, the only effect of this amend-
ment is to reinforce that decision.
The arguments over this amendment and in the Speers case seemed
to assume that it made some significant difference under the previous
law how this question was decided and, furthermore, that it was of
vital concern to general unsecured creditors. In fact, the difference was
of little importance; the decision did not affect general unsecured
creditors one iota. Under former section 67c(1) of the Bankruptcy
Act (now section 67c(3) under the amendment discussed below) all
tax liens on personal property not accompanied by possession were
subordinated to the first two priorities in section 64a (those for ad-
ministrative expenses and wage claims). All tax claims were entitled
to fourth priority under section 64a even though unliened or even
though a lien was invalidated under some other provision of the Act.
The only effect of the Speers decision with respect to an unfiled
federal tax lien on personal property not accompanied by possession
was to push the claim down to a fourth priority. In any event it would
have been pushed down to a two and one-half priority by section 67c,
after administrative expenses and wage claims, but before the third
priority (expenses of obtaining a denial of discharge or conviction of a
crime, which is economically unimportant) and the fourth priority for
unliened taxes. With respect to such liens the only significant effect of
the decision was to require the federal government to share on a parity
with unliened state tax claims rather than to come before the state tax
claims in position two and one-half. The benefit to general unsecured
creditors was not discernable.
With respect to real property, and with respect to three situations
stated below involving personal property, the decision demoted the
federal tax claim from the super priority of a secured debt to the
fourth priority, in cases where otherwise it would not have been sub-
ject to subordination under 67c: (1) where possession of the property
had been taken by the Government prior to bankruptcy but no notice
of the tax lien had been filed-a rather unlikely occurrence since there
is no reason to withhold the filing of the notice after a seizure of the
property; (2) where the lien had been enforced by sale prior to bank-
' 382 U.S. 266 (1965).
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ruptcy but no notice of the lien had been filed-a highly unlikely oc-
currence; and (3) where the estate of the bankrupt was solvent-in
which case priorities become meaningless since everyone gets paid in
full.47
In these instances where the lien was demoted by the decision from
the super priority of a secured debt to fourth priority, the beneficiaries
were the claimants for administrative expenses, wage claimants, and
state tax claims for unliened taxes (which were permitted to share
equally with the federal tax claim thus demoted). General unsecured
creditors would not receive any more as a result of the decision. Thus,
this was primarily an argument between trustees in bankruptcy and
their counsel, on the one hand, and the Treasury Department, on the
other, with the incidental beneficiaries (who strangely enough do not
seem to have participated in the argument) being state tax collectors
and wage claimants.
However, the major effect of this decision and the amendment con-
firming it (which for some reason was not remarked upon by the wit-
nesses at the hearing on the bills, but which may have been in the back
of their minds) arises when this rule is applied in conjunction with the
new provisions of section 64a(4) discussed above. As we have seen,
in some instances a tax lien with respect to which a notice has not been
filed will be pushed down all the way to the general unsecured cate-
gory, rather than merely to priority four. This situation is probably
most likely to arise where a deficiency is finally determined by com-
promise or litigation, a process which in many cases will take more
than three years after the due date of the return, and the assessment
is made. Frequently the taxpayer is unable in the case of a large
deficiency to pay the full amount immediately, and the Government is
usually willing to arrange in an appropriate case for its payment over
an extended period in installments.48 If a notice is not filed, the Govern-
'This statement is not entirely true, since exempt property is counted under the
Bankruptcy Act in determining solvency. § 1(19). As Collier points out, the estate
might be solvent and still everyone not be paid in full if exempt property makes the
difference between solvency and insolvency. 4 CO.LIER 190, 289. However, for this to
make any difference in the case we are considering (the question of invalidity vs.
subordination of a tax lien under the prior law), the amount of the exempt property
would have to exceed all of the general, non-priority claims plis priority (5) claims.
Therefore, for practical purposes this possibility can be ignored. This provision
might conceivably have applied with some practical effect in connection with the
restriction of wage and rent liens by former § 67c(1), although Collier does not cite
any case where this actually happened; and the provision has been eliminated by the
1966 amendments.
"IH.R REP. No. 686, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17, (1965) (Letter From Stanley S.
Surrey, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury); S. REP. No. 999, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
3 (1966) (Letter From Henry H. Fowler, Secretary of the Treasury).
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ment in any subsequent bankruptcy will probably lose its priority
entirely.4 9
It is possible therefore that in the future the Government may refuse
to agree to such deferred payments without filing a notice of the tax
lien, which may precipitate action by other creditors forcing the tax-
payer into bankruptcy in cases where otherwise he would have had
some hope of working his way out of the situation. This may be of
benefit to general creditors in some situations where the sooner the
debtor goes into bankruptcy the better off they are, since he is thus
prevented from getting further into debt to them. On the other hand,
they will obviously be prejudiced in cases where absent the filing of
the notice he would in fact have succeeded in working out the problem
and paying everyone in full. I do not know of any statistics which
would throw any light on the question of which of these results will be
more frequent than the other. In any event, it is doubtful that the
general unsecured creditors will receive a greater distribution in many
actual bankruptcy liquidations under the amendments to sections 70c
and 64a than they would have absent those amendments.
B. Section 67c(1)
The provisions of section 67c(1) of the Bankruptcy Act as amended
(corresponding to the former section 67c(2)), discussed in greater
detail below, invalidate in bankruptcy any statutory lien (1) which
first becomes effective "upon the insolvency of the debtor, or upon
distribution or liquidation of his property, or upon execution against
his property levied at the instance of one other than the lienor," or
(2) which is invalid as against a bona fide purchaser at the date of
bankruptcy, provided that if such a lien can be perfected against a
bona fide purchaser under applicable lien law it may be so perfected
after the date of bankruptcy and will then be valid against the trustee.
These provisions can have no application to the federal tax lien. In
the first place, a lien in favor of the United States is not specifically
covered, and there is a presumption that the sovereign is not included
in such a provision unless it is mentioned. 0 Secondly, the federal tax
lien does not arise upon insolvency or any of the other events men-
tioned, and while it may be invalid as against a bona fide purchaser if
notice is not filed, it can generally be perfected against such a pur-
'Assuming that the deficiency claim will be held to have become "due and owing"
at the due date of the return, rather than upon its final determination.
"Davis v. Pringle, 268 U.S. 315 (1925); Lewis v. United States, 92 U.S. 618
(1875); United States v. Herron, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 251 (1873).
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chaser at any time by filing the notice, so long as it is still collectible.
It is true that with respect to some types of property and some types of
purchasers, the mere filing of the notice does not perfect the federal
tax lien,"' and the number of these special situations has been expanded
by the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966.12 However, a levy can also be
made on such property" and there can be no doubt that the Govern-
ment's taking possession would perfect the lien against any bona fide
purchaser. Thirdly, an unfiled federal tax lien is already invalidated
by the provisions of section 70c.
With respect to state tax liens, the effect of these provisions cannot
be determined with certainty without making an investigation of the
tax lien statutes of each of the fifty states. Of course, the provisions
may not apply at all to state tax liens, since a lien in favor of a state is
not specifically mentioned. Former section 67c (1), subordinating cer-
tain statutory liens, specifically referred to "liens for taxes or debts
owing to the United States or to any State or any subdivision thereof"
and former section 67c(2), invalidating certain statutory liens, speci-
fically referred to liens for "debts owing to any person, including any
State or any subdivision thereof." However, the new Section 67c(2)
does refer to "claims for.., taxes.., secured by liens hereby inval-
idated [i.e. by section 67c(i)]" and states that they shall be given
the priority accorded them in section 64a. The need for such a pro-
vision is not apparent since section 67c has never been thought to
affect section 64a; but it does indicate that Congress thought it was
covering some tax liens in section 67c(1) . If state as well as federal
" IRC § 6323 has for many years excluded securities from the effect of the filed
notice, so that a bona fide purchaser of such securities without actual notice or
knowledge of the tax lien takes free of it even though the statutory notice has been
filed. In 1964 a similar exception was also made for motor vehicles. IRC § 6323(b)
(1), (2).
'280 Stat. 1125 (1966), U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4572 (1966). The exceptions,
giving priority to a bona fide purchaser without actual notice or knowledge even
though the statutory notice has been filed, have now been expanded to include a pur-
chaser of tangible personal property at retail sold in the ordinary course of the
seller's trade or business, and a purchaser of household goods and personal effects in a
"casual sale" for less than $250. IRC § 6323(b) (3) and (4) (as amended). There is also
an exception for a forty-five day period with respect to a purchaser of accounts re-
ceivable or chattel paper or real estate mortgages under a "commercial transactions
financing agreement." IRC §6323(c)(2) (as amended). However, this exception re-
quires that there must have been "a written agreement entered into before tax lien
filing" to purchase such collateral acquired by the taxpayer in the ordinary course of
his trade or business.
IRC § 6331.
The congressional reports also indicate that Congress intended to cover at least
some tax liens by § 67c(1):
In respect to the relation between new sections 67c(1) and 67c(3), it is the inten-
tion of the committee that a statutory tax lien on personal property not accom-
panied by possession should first be tested by the standards of section 67c(1).
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tax liens were held to be excluded by failure to mention them, this
statement in section 67c(2) would become even more nonsensical than
it already is.
Furthermore, although the Supreme Court has assumed in several
cases that the rule that the sovereign is presumed not to be included in
a statutory provision may apply to the question whether a state govern-
ment is subject to a federal statute,55 it has understandably given it
much less force in that situation than where the question involved the
United States56 Since this is merely a rule of construction in any
event,17 a state tax lien should be held to be covered by section 67c(1).
The question is probably not too important since state tax liens do
not normally arise upon insolvency or any of the other events men-
tioned. While they may for some reason be unperfected as against a
bona fide purchaser, they can normally be perfected by some action as
long as they are still enforceable. In fact, any type of lien, statutory or
otherwise, which is not valid as against a bona fide purchaser and can-
not be made so by any action of the lienor, but which is still enforceable,
is a very strange creature indeed, if not entirely mythological."
Section 67c(3) is then to be applied to those liens which have not been invali-
dated by section 67c(1).
H.R. REP. No. 686, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1965).
r- Before the United States and the states were specifically included in § 57n of the
Bankruptcy Act requiring the filing of proofs of claims, it was generally assumed
that the states were not covered; and it was customary to secure a bar order against
both state and federal claims. The Supreme Court recognized this practice in New
York v. Irving Trust Co., 288 U.S. 329 (1933), and stated in dictum: "It is admitted
here, that as the United States and the States are not mentioned in the limitation of
§ 57, they are not bound thereby." Id. at 331. [Emphasis added.] However, there does
not seem to have been any square holding on this point by an appellate court.
" Plumbers Local 298, AFL v. County of Door, 359 U.S. 354 (1959) ; Gardner v.
New Jersey, 329 U.S. 565 (1947) (no mention of the presumption); California v.
United States, 320 U.S. 577, 585 (1944) ("We need not waste time on useless general-
ities about statutory construction...."); United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175
(1936); United States v. California, 328 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1964). Compare, as to the
United States, United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258
(1947), and the cases cited note 50, supra.
' Cook County Nat'l Bank v. United States, 107 U.S. 445 (1882).
A reasonably intensive search of the laws of sixteen States, in which according
to the latest figures more than 71% of all straight bankruptcy asset cases were filed
involving more than 77% of all of the assets collected in such cases, has failed to reveal
a single tax lien which would clearly be invalidated by the provisions of § 67c(1)
(assuming them to be covered by it).
There are a number of tax liens on personal property which are stated not to be
good against a bona fide purchaser. For example, CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE §§ 2191.3,
2191.4 (1956) (personal property tax); CaL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 6738, 6757 (1956)
(sales tax); CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE §§ 14301, 14303 (1956) (inheritance tax); CAL.
REv. & TAX. CODE §§ 16061, 16062 (1956) (gift tax); CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1703
(1956) (unemployment insurance contributions); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, §§720, 721
(1966) (unemployment insurance contributions); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, §444a
(1966) (sales tax); FLA. STAT. § 198.22 (1965) (estate tax); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 60,§ 37 (Supp. 1964) (real property tax) ; MICH. STAT. ANN. § 7.81 (1960) (personal
property tax); N.Y. TAX LAW § 1092(j) (1954) (corporation tax, franchise tax, and
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III. SUBORDINWATION OF TAx LIENS
Former section 67c(1) of the Bankruptcy Act subordinated to the
first two priorities under section 64a all "statutory liens, including liens
for taxes or debts owing to the United States or to any State or any
subdivision thereof, on personal property not accompanied by posses-
sion of such property," unless enforced by sale before bankruptcy and
except where the estate was solvent. The new section 67c(3), the
corresponding provision in the new act, provides:
Every tax lien on personal property not accompanied by possession
shall be postponed in payment to the debts specified in clauses (1) and
(2) of subdivision a of section 64 of this Act. Where such a tax lien
is prior in right to liens indefeasible in bankruptcy, the court shall order
payment from the proceeds derived from the sale of the personal property
to which the tax lien attaches, less the actual cost of that sale, of an
amount not in excess of the tax lien, to the debts specified in clauses (1)
and (2) of subdivision a of section 64 of this Act. If the amount
realized from the sale exceeds the total of such debts, after allowing for
state and national bank tax); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §§ 2485-801, 2485-806 (1964) (in-
heritance tax); VA. CODE ANN. § 58-838.4 (1950) (tax on forest products); VA. CODE
ANN. § 58-180 (1950) (inheritance tax); VA. CODE ANN. § 58-227 (1950) (gift tax).
However, in every one of these cases, the government may also take possession of the
personal property (usually by a distraint), and in that event the lien would undoubtedly
become good against a bona fide purchaser. CAL. REv. & TAx. CODE §§ 2914 (1956)
(personal property tax) ; 6776 (sales tax) ; 14321 (inheritance tax) ; 16071 (gift tax) ;
CAL. UNzExP. INS. CODE § 1785 (1956) (unemployment insurance contributions) ; ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 723 (1966) (unemployment insurance contributions), and ch. 120,
§ 444f (sales tax) ; FLA. STAT. § 198.20 (1965) (estate tax); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 60,
§ 53 (1964) (real property tax); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 7.83 (1960) (personal property
tax); N.Y. TAx LAw § 1092(j) (1954) (lien becomes good against a bona fide pur-
chaser upon the issuance of a "notice of deficiency"); PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 72,§ 2485-825 (1964) (inheritance tax); VA. CODE §§ 58-41, 58-42, 58-43 (1950) (tax
on forest products); § 58-181 (inheritance tax); § 58-228 (gift tax). It may be
argued, of course, that these provisions for distraint warrants provide methods
of "enforcing" rather than "perfecting" the tax liens; and, therefore, such liens
cannot be "perfected" against a bona fide purchaser and would be invalid under
§67c(1)(B). All such a ruling would force a state to do is to provide for a
separate warrant expressly labelled a method of "perfecting" the tax lien and,
even though never used, its mere availability would validate the tax lien under§ 67c(1)(B). It is difficult to believe that any court would engage in such point-
less semantics at the present day.
There remains a handful of tax lien statutes which provide that the lien is not
good as against a bona fide purchaser, and which contain no statutory method of per-
fection of the lien except by a court action to foreclose it. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 23-745 (1956) (unemployment insurance contributions); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 42-1526 (1956) (estate tax); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 397 (1966) (inheritance tax,
after it has been due for five years); N.Y. TAx LAW § 249-bb (1954) (estate tax: dis-
traint warrant can only issue six months after the tax is due; during this six months
period there is no statutory method of perfection except by judicial foreclosure). It is
of course more difficult to argue in these few cases that such a method of perfection
would be available after bankruptcy under § 67c(1) (B), since an action to foreclose the
lien would no longer be possible. However, again all that the State need do in these
instances is to provide for a statutory method of seizure, even if it never contemplates
using it, and this would take the lien out of § 67c(1) (B).
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prior indefeasible liens and the cost of the sale, the excess up to the
amount of the difference between the total paid to the debts specified in
clauses (1) and (2) of subdivision a of section 64 of this Act and the
amount of the tax lien, is to be paid to the holder of the tax lien.
Clause (5) of new section 67c provides that the entire subdivision c
shall not apply "to liens enforced by sale before the filing of the
petition."
The first sentence of this provision, while it eliminates the subor-
dination of non-tax statutory liens, was clearly intended to cover
exactly the same tax liens as those covered by the previous provision."
However, a question can be raised as to whether a federal tax lien is
in fact subordinated by the new section 67c(3). Since the former
provision specifically referred to a lien in favor of the United States,
and this statement has been eliminated from the new one, an argu-
ment can be made that such a lien is not covered, under the rule that
the sovereign is presumed not to be included in a statute unless
specifically mentioned."0 It is true that a tax lien necessarily arises in
favor of some sovereign; but it can be argued that the new provision
applies only to state tax liens, since the presumption in question, if
applicable at all to a state government in connection with a federal
statute, has much less force as so applied than when applied to the
federal government.61
There is no doubt that there was no intention of making any such
change in the law, and the proponents of the bill, the Treasury Depart-
ment and the various congressional committees considering it all
assumed that a federal tax lien was still covered. The overwhelming
evidence of this legislative history should be sufficient to cause a court
to hold that federal tax liens are still subject to subordination under
the new section. At the same time, it is regrettable (and inexplicable)
that this point should have been left unresolved by the statutory
language, particularly when the draftsmen had the example of the
careful coverage of it in the former section 67c(1) before them.
r The reference to a situation where the estate is solvent has been eliminated, but
that was largely irrelevant anyway since in that case priorities generally become
meaningless because everyone is paid in full. But see note 47 supra.
The provision has also been modified by the addition of a statement in § 67c(5)
that the subdivision does not apply to liens on exempt property or property abandoned
by the trustee. Since neither of these types of property are available for the payment
of administrative expenses and wage claims, subordination of a lien upon such
property to those claims would be meaningless. This statement assumes significance
only in connection with the invalidation of statutory liens by new § 67c(1).
' Note 50 supra.
o' Note 56 supra.
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The remaining provisions of the new section 67c(3) are intended to
deal with the problem arising from the decision in In re Quaker City
Uniform Co.62 in the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The
problem arises when a statutory lien subordinated in bankruptcy is
superior to another lien not subordinated. In that case a landlord's
lien was subordinated which was superior by state law to a chattel
mortgage, not subordinated. However, the problem arose more often
in connection with tax liens, simply because they were more numerous;
and it will hereafter arise only in connection with tax liens because
they are now the only ones subordinated.
The question that arises is how the apparent circular priority thus
created should be resolved. For example, if a tax lien exists as to which
notice has been filed prior to the grant of a chattel mortgage (now a
security interest under the UCC), it is prior to the chattel mortgage.
However, if the tax lien is not accompanied by possession at the date of
bankruptcy, it is subordinated by this provision to the administrative
expenses and wage claims. On the other hand, the chattel mortgage if
properly recorded or filed, and not otherwise invalidated by some pro-
vision of the Bankruptcy Act, is indefeasible in bankruptcy and is not
subordinated (at least explicitly) to the administrative expenses and
wage claims. Therefore, the apparent order of priority is: the tax lien
is prior to the chattel mortgage, which is prior to the administrative
expenses and wage claims, which are prior to the tax lien. The same
situation might arise with respect to another statutory lien which is
not subordinated to administrative expenses and wage claims (because
it is accompanied by possession, or is enforced by sale prior to the fil-
ing of the petition, or is a non-tax lien not invalidated by section 67c
(1)), but which itself is subordinate to a tax lien subordinated to those
two priorities.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in the Quaker City case
solved this problem by saying that the subordinated lien carried down
with it all liens subordinate to it. Thus, in the illustration of the chattel
mortgage, the order of distribution would be: (1) administrative ex-
penses; (2) wage claims; (3) tax lien; (4) chattel mortgage. The
chattel mortgage ends up at the bottom, and the fortuitous existence of
a subordinated lien, no matter how small, under this decision resulted
in subordinating and perhaps as a practical matter destroying any
lien subordinate to it. For example, assume in the illustration above
'238 F.2d 155 (3d. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1030 (1957).
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that the administrative expenses and wage claims amounted to 5,000
dollars; the tax lien was for one dollar; the chattel mortgage secured a
debt of 5,000 dollars; and 5,000 dollars was realized upon a sale of the
property. According to this decision, the order of distribution would
be: administrative expenses and wage claims-5,000 dollars; tax lien
-nothing; chattel mortgage-nothing, even though Congress did not
subordinate the chattel mortgage to the administrative expenses and
wage claims. 3
It is not surprising that almost all commentators disagreed with
this approach 4 or that the decision found no favor outside the Third
Circuit."3 That circuit refused to abandon it,"0 probably more out of
pride than conviction; but it seems likely that the Supreme Court, if
and when it got around to it, would have overruled the Quaker City
case. In any event, that decision has now been abrogated by the new
provisions of section 67c(3).
These provisions adopt the solution to this problem suggested by the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in California State Department
of Employment v. United States:o7 the ordinary priority of liens under
section 67b is to be applied first in the distribution of the assets, and
then a sufficient amount taken away from the subordinated lien (if
there is sufficient) to satisfy the administrative expenses and wage
claims. For example, to take a slightly more realistic illustration than
that discussed above, suppose that the tax lien was 2,000 dollars, the
administrative expenses and wage claims were 3,000 dollars, the chat-
tel mortgage was 5,000 dollars, and the property brought only 5,000
dollars upon sale. The tax lien would first be given 2,000 dollars and
the chattel mortgage 3,000 dollars in the order of their priority; the
'The statement in several places in the congressional committee reports and at
the hearing on these bills, that the Quaker City doctrine would even result in sub-
ordinating a chattel mortgage which was prior to the subordinated statutory lien, is
wholly erroneous. H.R. REP. No. 686, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1965) ; S. REP. No. 227,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1965). Hearing 23. How much this misconception contributed
to the passage of the bill it is difficult to say.
C" See Kupfer, A "Puzzlement": The Quaker City Uniform Case, Its Impacts and
Aftermaths, 12 Bus. LAw. 280 (1957); Wolfe & Forman, Circuity of Liens and
Priorities, 38 REF. J. 36 (1964) ; Note, 70 HAlV. L. REv. 1296 (1957).
SJordan v. Hamlett, 312 F.2d 121 (5th Cir. 1963); California State Dep't. of
Employment v. United States, 210 F.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1954); City of New Orleans v.
Harrell, 134 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1943); In re American Zyloptic Co., Inc., 181 F. Supp.
77 (E.D.N.Y. 1960). But cf. Brod v. Third Realty Co., 340 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1965),
where the court apparently misunderstood the case of Jordon v. Hamlett upon which
it relied; however, since one of the two chattel mortgagees in the Brod case did not
appeal, it would seem that the result of the case is correct on that basis alone.
'In re Einhorn Bros., Inc., 272 F.2d 434 (3rd Cir. 1959); In re Lehigh Valley
Mills, Inc., 225 F. Supp. 494 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
'210 F.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1954).
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entire 2,000 dollars would then be taken from the tax lien and given
to the administrative expenses and wage claims, leaving the tax lien
with nothing. The final distribution would thus be:
Claim Amt. of Claim Amt. Paid
Tax lien $2,000 -0-
Adm. expenses $1,000 $1,000
Wage claims $2,000 $1,000
Chattel mtge. $5,000 $3,000
On the other hand, if the subordinated tax lien were in excess of the
total of the administrative expenses and wage claims, it would retain
that excess. Thus, if the tax lien were for 4,000 dollars (rather than
2,000 dollars) in the above case the final distribution would be:
Claim Amt. of Claim Amt. Paid
Tax lien $4,000 $1,000
Adm. expenses &
wage claims $3,000 $3,000
Chattel mtge. $5,000 $1,000
An argument can be made that the chattel mortgage should get
2,000 dollars here and the tax lien nothing, which would give the chattel
mortgage more than the amount of its priority absent the provisions
of Section 67c(3). This argument would be based on the language,
"after allowing for prior indefeasible liens," in the sentence which
states that the excess of the proceeds over the amount of the admini-
strative expenses and wage claims, up to the difference between the
amount of such expenses and claims and the amount of the tax lien,
shall be paid to the tax lien. However, the "prior" indefeasible liens
referred to here are those prior to the tax lien, since all indefeasible
liens (other than tax liens subject to this provision) are prior to the
administrative expenses and wage claims. In other words, this quali-
fication was merely intended to avoid any implication that liens prior
to the tax lien, which are not involved in this circle at all, are affected
by this provision."
See H.R. REP. No. 686, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1965):
This solution thus avoids the situation where the fortuitous intercession of a
subsequent tax lien may result in little or nothing being left for the secured
creditor as occurred in Quaker City. At the same time, it prevents a lienor who
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This provision is a desirable correction of the situation existing in
the Third Circuit, which if permitted to continue might eventually
have infected other areas of the country before its final resolution by
the Supreme Court. And, on the whole, it seems as equitable a solu-
tion as can be found. Congress desired and continues to desire to levy
contribution upon certain liens, but not others, for the purpose of
paying administrative expenses and wage claims. In accomplishing
this purpose, there is no reason to disturb the ordinary priority of
these Hens among themselves. To say, as the Third Circuit did, that
the superior lien may end up with nothing is irrelevant; Congress must
have contemplated that it would always end up with less, and perhaps
with nothing, when it said that it was to be subordinated to some other
claim. The ironic result in the Quaker City case, which has frequently
been commented upon, was that both the superior lien and the inferior
Hen ended up with nothing; the administrative expenses and wage
claims took the entire proceeds, primarily from the lien which Congress
had said was not to be subordinated to them.
There is, however, one situation which the language of the new sec-
tion fails to take into account, namely, where the proceeds of the sale
of the property exceed the amount of the tax lien plus the amount of
the chattel mortgage (or other non-subordinated lien which is inferior
to the tax lien). For example, in the case last considered, assume that
the proceeds of the property are 10,000 dollars (rather than 5,000 dol-
lars). The statute provides that the administrative expenses and wage
claims (3,000 dollars) are to be paid first, but not exceeding the tax
lien (4,000 dollars). Then the excess of the proceeds over the adminis-
trative expenses and wage claims are to be paid to the tax lien, but only
"up to the amount of the difference between the total paid to the
[administrative expenses and wage claims] ... and the amount of the
tax lien" (1,000 dollars). It is contemplated that the balance of such
excess will go to the chattel mortgage; but in this case the amount of
the chattel mortgage is less than that balance. Therefore, so far as
section 67c(3) goes the distribution would be:
has a lien subsequent to a tax lien from receiving more than he would get if
bankruptcy had not occurred.
The illustrations on the same page of this report make it clear that this clause was
intended to save liens prior to the tax lien, but not to give a subordinate lien any-
thing until the administrative expenses and wage claims and the tax lien between
them had been given the full amount of the tax lien. The provision was probably
inserted because of the erroneous notion of Congress that the Quaker City case sub-
ordinated liens prior to the tax lien. See note 63 supra. See also, S. RFP. No. 972,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1966).
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Claim Amt. of Claim Amt. Paid
Tax lien $4,000 $1,000
Adm. expenses &
wage claims $3,000 $3,000
Chattel mtge. $5,000 $5,000
But this leaves 1,000 dollars unaccounted for. Obviously, it should
go to the tax lien, since it still has a deficit of 3,000 dollars and the
other two claimants have been paid in full. An argument could be
made from the literal language of section 67c(3) that this 1,000 dol-
lars should go into the general pot to be distributed through the re-
maining section 64a priorities. However, this would be an unwarranted
negative implication from the statute; it simply does not say what is to
be done with this 1,000 dollars. Therefore, the general rule apart from
section 67c(3) that a valid lien has priority over all section 64a priori-
ties should be applied.
IV. DISCHARGE OF TAX CLAIMS
Heretofore, all tax claims have been non-dischargeable in bank-
ruptcy. Section 17a(1) listed "taxes" as among those debts which
were not released by a discharge in bankruptcy. This result was not of
any practical consequence in the case of a corporation, since a corpora-
tion which went into straight bankruptcy (as distinguished from a
Chapter proceeding) was almost always abandoned; its theoretical
continued liability for unpaid taxes was meaningless. However, in the
case of an individual or partnership, the fact that no taxes could ever
be discharged was a frequent source of difficulty to a person attempting
to rehabilitate himself after a financial failure.
Out of solicitude for such individuals, Congress enacted the provi-
sions of the new section 17a(1), which have been set out above. The
previous discussion of those provisions in connection with the priority
of tax claims is directly pertinent here. However, there are two vital
points which may make their effect with respect to discharge entirely
different.
The first point is concerned with the meaning of the statement that
"a discharge in bankruptcy shall not release or affect any tax lien."
A tax lien is a general, floating lien which automatically attaches to
all after-acquired property of the taxpayer at the moment of its ac-
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quisition. The tax lien is effective as of the time of assessment. 9 If
the statement that the discharge does not "affect" any tax lien means
that such a lien still attaches to property of the bankrupt acquired
after the discharge, this proviso nullifies the purported grant of a dis-
charge with respect to all income taxes assessed prior to the filing of
the petition, or perhaps prior to the granting of the discharge. Nor
would it make any difference that the lien might be invalid (because
unfiled) as against the trustee in bankruptcy under section 70c. It
has never been suggested that the invalidation of a tax lien as against
the trustee in bankruptcy would affect in any way its validity as
against the taxpayer himself, any more than would a similar subor-
dination of an unfiled tax lien to an actual judgment creditor. 0
The discussion above concerning the various provisions of the new
section 17a(1) reveals that in every instance where a federal income
tax debt is purported to be discharged, with one minor exception, it is
a tax which has been assessed (and therefore with respect to which a
lien has arisen), assuming that our conclusions as to the most probable
interpretations of these provisions are valid. The one exception is the
case where a prohibition on assessment has lifted upon the expiration
of ninety days after the ninety-day letter or upon a decision of the
Tax Court becoming final, and the filing of a petition in bankruptcy
precedes the assessment within the sixty day assessment period. If the
provision that a discharge does not affect any tax lien refers not only
to a tax lien in existence at the date of filing the petition but also to one
in existence at the time of granting the discharge, even this minor
exception would largely disappear, since presumably the assessment
would always be made upon receipt by the Government of the notice of
the first meeting of creditors, if not made previously.
The fact that this interpretation would virtually nullify section 17a
(1) insofar as it purports to grant a discharge of any federal income
taxes should create a strong presumption that it is not a correct inter-
pretation of the intention of Congress. On the other hand, if it is said
that the provision only means that the discharge does not affect any
' Note 18 supra.
' It may be argued that, even though the discharge does not prevent the tax lien
from attaching to after-acquired property, it does destroy the debt in some instances;
and therefore since the lien has no debt to support it, it fails too. The minor premise
of this argument would seem to be erroneous, since it has been consistently held that
a discharge in bankruptcy does not affect a valid lien, for example on exempt prop-
erty. 1 COLLIER 17.29; 4 COLLIER 272. In any event, this would merely be another
way of saying that the discharge does in fact "affect" the tax lien, to the extent of pre-
venting it from attaching to after-acquired property.
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tax lien with respect to property owned by the bankrupt at the date
of filing the petition, the proviso becomes meaningless insofar as it
relates to section 17a(1). A discharge operates only prospectively; it
does not relieve any of the existing property of the bankrupt from
liability to be taken to pay his obligations. The whole purpose of the
bankruptcy proceeding is to take existing property and apply it to those
obligations, while releasing after-acquired property if the bankrupt
obtains a discharge. To say that a discharge does not release or affect
a lien as it applies to existing property is a nonsensical statement,
except with respect to exempt property which is not involved here.7 1
The true explanation of this proviso seems to be that it was not
intended to have anything to do with section 17a(1), although that is
where it appears, but rather with section 64a into which it is incorpora-
ted by reference. In other words, it was intended to negative any in-
ference that by denying priority to certain tax claims there was an
intent to include liened taxes as well as unliened taxes. It was simply
a blunder in drafting caused by the dubious attempt to deal with two
different problems by language in one section which is to be incorpo-
rated by reference into another. If this explanation is accepted, then a
court should hold that this proviso has no effect so far as the question
of discharge is concerned.
The second point mentioned above is that the filing or nonfiling of a
notice under IRC section 6323 is irrelevant in connection with dis-
charge, since our conclusion must be (if this section is to have any
application) that a tax lien becomes invalid as against the taxpayer
after discharge where the tax debt is purported to be discharged by
these provisions. It is of no importance whether the lien was valid or
invalid as against the trustee. With modification for this factor, the
outline above indicating what taxes will be denied priority is also
applicable to determine what taxes will be discharged.
Based upon our conclusions as to the most reasonable interpretations
of these provisions, a bankrupt probably will be discharged from the
following federal income taxes:
1. A deficiency claim which has been finally determined (whether
or not assessed) prior to bankruptcy, arising out of a nonfraudu-
lent return which was due more than three years prior to bank-
ruptcy.
2. A claim for taxes with respect to which (a) no return was filed,
'Exempt property is specifically covered by another provision in the new § 17a(1).
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(b) the due date of the return was more than three years prior
to bankruptcy, and (c) the tax was assessed more than one year
prior to bankruptcy.
3. A claim for taxes correctly reported on a return due more than
three years prior to bankruptcy, or if an extension of time for
payment was obtained prior to the due date of the return or in-
stallment payments were elected, where such extended or deferred
dates were more than three years prior to bankruptcy.
It can thus be seen that the discharge provisions, assuming that
their apparent nullification by the final proviso regarding tax liens can
be overcome, may have some substantial effect in relieving a bankrupt
of ancient tax debts, as contrasted with the almost total ineffectiveness
of such provisions in denying priority to tax claims, despite the fact
that the language is identical. On the other hand, this possible result
may cause the Internal Revenue Service to be less lenient in arranging
for deferred payments of tax liabilities where the liabilities relate to a
tax year already more than three years in the past or where the pro-
posed schedule of payments will extend to a time more than three years
after the due date of the return.72 Whether taxpayers in general will
be benefited or harmed by these new provisions remains to be seen.
V. INvALIDATION OF OTHER STATUTORY LIENS
Section 67c(2) of the Bankruptcy Act has heretofore invalidated all
state statutory liens, other than tax liens, "on personal property not
accompanied by possession of, or by levy upon or by sequestration or
distraint of, such property," except where enforced by sale prior to
the filing of the petition or where the estate was solvent. So far as such
liens were concerned, this provision, enacted in 1952, largely super-
seded that of former section 67c(1), enacted in 1938, which sub-
ordinated to the first two priorities in section 64a statutory liens "on
personal property not accompanied by possession of such property."
However, former section 67c(1) also subordinated liens "of distress
for rent," whether statutory or not and whether or not accompanied
by possession. Therefore, former section 67c(1) subordinated the fol-
lowing non-tax liens which were untouched by section 67c(2): (1)
statutory liens accompanied by levy, sequestration or distraint, but not
'H.R. REP.No. 687, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1965) (Letter From Stanley S. Surrey,
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury); S. REP. No. 999, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966),
U.S. CODE Co G. & AD. NEWS 2019 (Letter From Henry H. Fowler, Secretary of the
Treasury).
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by possession; (2) non-statutory landlords' liens; (3) statutory land-
lords' liens of "distress for rent" which were accompanied by pos-
session."
The new provisions restrict subordination to tax liens, and deal with
the invalidation of other statutory liens in the new section 67c(1),
which provides:
The following liens shall be invalid against the trustee:
(A) every statutory lien which first becomes effective upon the insol-
vency of the debtor, or upon distribution or liquidation of his property,
or upon execution against his property levied at the instance of one other
than the lienor;
(B) every statutory lien which is not perfected or enforceable at the date
of bankruptcy against one acquiring the rights of a bona fide purchaser
from the debtor on that date, whether or not such purchaser exists:
Provided, That where a statutory lien is not invalid at the date of bank-
ruptcy against the trustee under subdivision c of section 70 of this Act
and is required by applicable lien law to be perfected in order to be
valid against a subsequent bona fide purchaser, such a lien may never-
theless be valid under this subdivision if perfected within the time per-
mitted by and in accordance with the requirements of such law; And
provzided further, That if applicable lien law requires a lien valid against
the trustee under section 70, subdivision c, to be perfected by the
seizure of property, it shall instead be perfected as permitted by this
subdivision c of section 67 by filing notice thereof with the court;
(C) every statutory lien for rent and every lien of distress for rent,
whether statutory or not. A right of distress for rent which creates a
security interest in property shall be deemed a lien for the purposes of
this subdivision c.
Statutory lien is defined for the purpose of these provisions in the new
section 1 (29a), as follows:
"Statutory lien" shall mean a lien arising solely by force of statute upon
specified circumstances or conditions, but shall not include any lien
provided by or dependent upon an agreement to give security, whether
or not such lien is also provided by or is also dependent upon statute
and whether or not the agreement or lien is made fully effective by
statute.
The purpose of this definition of statutory lien, as explained in the
Committee reports,74 is to negative the suggestion in the first opinion
'A statutory landlord's lien accompanied by possession which was not a lien of
"distress for rent" was apparently untouched by either former § 67c(1) or former
§ 67c(2). See 4 COLLIER 228.
" H.tR REP. No. 686, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1965); S. REP,. No. 277, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. 21 (1965).
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in the Quaker City case," subsequently withdrawn, that a chattel
mortgage was a "statutory lien" within the meaning of section 67c,
subject to its subordination and invalidation provisions. While the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upon rehearing withdrew that
statement, it stated in its second opinion that it was "not necessary
to decide" whether a chattel mortgage was a statutory lien, 6 since the
same result followed from its decision that the subordinated lien car-
ried down with it the chattel mortgage to which it was superior. How-
ever, the Third Circuit has shown no disposition to revive this egre-
gious error,7 and the Second Circuit has expressly repudiated it."
Thus, Congress in enacting this definition was apparently merely beat-
ing a dead snake with a stick.
However, the definition may have two collateral effects which there
is no evidence were considered by Congress. The first relates to a
statutory lien given to a secured party upon property in addition to
that covered by his security agreement, which arises upon the institu-
tion of insolvency proceedings. The most important example of such a
lien is contained in section 9-306(4) (d) of the Uniform Commercial
Code, [hereinafter called UCC] which grants to the secured party
"in insolvency proceedings" a lien upon all cash and bank accounts of
the debtor equal in amount to the proceeds received by the debtor from
the sale of collateral within ten days prior to the institution of such
proceedings and not paid over to the secured party.79 Heretofore,
there has been a substantial question whether such lien was not a
In re Quaker City Uniform Co., CCH FED. BANI-NG L. REP. 58,778 (rd Cir.
1956).
" In re Quaker City Uniform Co., 238 F.2d 155, 158 (3d Cir. 1956).
' When it was pointed out to the Third Circuit upon rehearing in the Quaker
City case that its interpretation would invalidate all chattel mortgages in bankruptcy
since the addition of § 67c(2) in 1952, it escaped from this embarrassment by stating
that the chattel mortgage involved had been created prior to 1952. Yet when con-
fronted with a security interest under the Uniform Commercial Code created after
1952 in In re Einhorn Bros., Inc., 272 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1959), the Third Circuit
exhibited a deafening silence on this point.
In re New Haven Clock & Watch Co., 253 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1958).
7' Section 9-306(4) (d) provides:
In the event of insolvency proceedings instituted by or against a debtor, a secured
party with a perfected security interest in proceeds has a perfected security in-
terest...
(d) in all cash and bank accounts of the debtor, if other cash proceeds have
been commingled or deposited in a bank account, but the perfected security inter-
est under this paragraph (d) is
(i) subject to any right of set-off; and(ii) limited to an amount not greater than the amount of any cash proceeds
received by the debtor within ten days before the institution of the insolvency
proceedings and commingled or deposited in a bank account prior to the insolv-
ency proceedings less the amount of cash proceeds received by the debtor and paid
over to the secured party during the ten day period.
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"statutory lien" invalidated by section 67c 0 ° Under the new definition
it can be plausibly argued that this lien of UCC section 9-306(4) (d)
is not a statutory lien since, although it is not "provided by" the se-
curity agreement but by the statute, it is nevertheless one that is
"dependent upon" the agreement to give security. If so, it would no
longer be vulnerable under section 67c.
Even if this interpretation is adopted, it probably would not change
the result in this particular case since the lien of UCC section 9-306
(4) (d) would also appear to be vulnerable under section 70c of the
Bankruptcy Act. The lien of UCC section 9-306(4) (d) would nor-
mally come into existence at the time the petition in bankruptcy is
filed, and as of that time the trustee in bankruptcy has the rights of a
creditor obtaining a lien by legal proceedings upon all the property of
the bankrupt. The rights of the trustee under section 70c should take
priority over any such lien created by state law as of the instant of
bankruptcy.8 However, this would not be true in the case where a
bankruptcy is preceeded by an assignment for the benefit of creditors
or other state insolvency proceeding, since in that case the lien under
UCC section 9-306(4) (d) would arise at the time the assignment is
made and would no longer be vulnerable to a lien creditor at the date
of bankruptcy.
In the last situation mentioned, however, the lien of UCC section
9-306(4) (d) would probably be a voidable preference. Under section
60 of the Bankruptcy Act any transfer, "voluntary or involuntary," of
the debtor's property to or for the benefit of a creditor on account of
an antecedent debt, made within four months prior to bankruptcy
while the debtor is insolvent and which would enable the creditor to
receive a greater percentage of his debt than other creditors of the same
class is voidable if the creditor had reasonable cause to believe the
debtor was insolvent. A transfer would occur at the time of the making
of the assignment, even though involuntarily by force of this statute,
and to the extent that the creditor is otherwise unsecured would enable
him to receive a greater percentage of his debt than other creditors of
the same class. If the secured party is fully secured without the addi-
tional lien of UCC section 9-306 (4) (d) the argument will not arise. If
the debtor was insolvent and the creditor had reasonable cause to believe
that he was, both of which circumstances are highly likely to exist at
"See Marsh, Book Review, 13 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 898, 907-08 (1966).1 N.W. Day Supply Co. v. Valenti, 343 F.2d 756 (1st Cir. 1965). But cf. Hertzberg
v. Associates Discount Corp., 272 F.2d 6 (6th Cir. 1959), cert. danied, 362 U3.S. 950
(1960).
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the very moment the debtor makes an assignment for the benefit of
his creditors, then the conclusion seems fairly clear that the lien is
voidable as a preference."2 The transfer would necessarily occur with-
in four months of bankruptcy, since the petition must be filed within
that time after the making of an assignment.83
Therefore, this new definition of statutory lien, while interesting, is
probably not significant in connection with such liens as that of UCC
section 9-306 (4) (d).
The second aspect of this definition which was apparently not con-
sidered is its possible impact upon judicial liens. The definition ap-
parently proceeds upon the assumption that there are only two kinds
of liens, "statutory" and consensual (i.e. provided by an "agreement
to give security"). In fact, the Bankruptcy Act has always accorded
quite different treatment to three categories of liens-statutory, con-
sensual and judicial. The latter are not defined (nor were any of the
others prior to this amendment), but are referred to in several places
in the act as liens "obtained by legal or equitable process or proceed-
ings." Section 67a invalidates such liens if obtained within four months
of bankruptcy while the debtor is insolvent.
However, many, if not all, such judicial liens will literally fit the new
definition of "statutory lien." The judgment lien, for example, arises
"solely by force of statute" (since the judgment lien is purely a crea-
ture of statute) "upon specified circumstances or conditions" (namely,
the docketing or recordation of the judgment). The attachment lien
and the execution lien may be slightly more difficult to fit into this
definition, since normally some action of the creditor and of the sheriff
are necessary to obtain them, but they are nevertheless created by
statute, they arise upon specified circumstances or conditions, and
they are not provided by or dependent upon any agreement to give
security.
While it is to be hoped that the courts will recognize that this de-
finition was not intended to have any relationship to this third category
of liens, the matter is not free from doubt. The only practical result
of a decision including such judicial liens within the definition would
be in connection with landlords' claims for rent. It would appear that
the first two invalidating clauses of the new section 67c(1) would al-
most never be applicable to such judicial liens. They do not arise
" The arguments of Professor Gilmore to the contrary do not seem to me to be
persuasive. 2 Gi-moRE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 1344 (1965).
' Bankruptcy Act § 3b.
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upon insolvency or any of the other events mentioned. While they may
be invalid as against a bona fide purchaser, it would seem that they can
normally be made valid against such a purchaser by some action. 4
The most important effect of including judicial liens within this
definition, however, would be in connection with clause (C) of section
67c(1) invalidating "every statutory lien for rent." This interpreta-
tion would result in invalidating every attachment, judgment or exe-
cution Hen obtained upon a tenant's property based upon a claim for
rent, even though obtained more than four months before bankruptcy
or while the debtor was solvent. Any such "Henry Georgian animo-
sity" towards landlords, as Judge Frank once said,5 should not be
attributed to Congress. But the contrary argument can be made that
this entire clause (C) exhibits exactly such an animosity towards land-
lords, since it invalidates their liens without any regard to the infirmi-
ties required in the case of liens in favor of other persons; therefore,
to extend it to an attachment lien obtained by a landlord is merely
further carrying out this intent. Nevertheless, I believe the more
weighty arguments support the view that judicial liens were not in-
tended to be included within the new definition of "statutory lien" in
the absence of a clearer expression of that intent.
Assuming that we can determine what a statutory lien is under the
new definition, which ones will be invalidated under the new provi-
sions? It should first be pointed out that if a statutory lien is not
valid at the time of bankruptcy against an attaching, execution or
judgment creditor, it is already invalid against the trustee in bank-
ruptcy under the provisions of section 70c. While section 67b generally
validates statutory liens in bankruptcy "notwithstanding the provisions
of section 60," it does not say "notwithstanding the provisions of
For example, suppose that an execution lien arises upon delivery of the writ to
the sheriff, which is valid as against other creditors but not valid against a bona fide
purchaser until actual levy. See. e.g., New York Civ. PRAc. §§ 5202 (a), 5234(b)
(1963); 2 FREE SA r, ExEcuTioNs § 200 (3d ed. 1900). The levy is delayed for more
than four months for reasons which do not defeat or impair the lien of the judgment
creditor under local law. A bankruptcy petition is filed four months and one day after
the delivery of the writ. Such a lien might be invulnerable under § 67a. Would it be
invalid under the new § 67c(1) (B), if it is held to be a "statutory lien"? It would ap-
pear not, because, although it is invalid as against a bona fide purchaser at the date of
bankruptcy, it can be made so valid by the sheiff making the actual levy (i.e., seizing
the property). Section 67c(1)(B) provides that in that case it can be made valid by
filing notice with the bankruptcy court. (But see note 94 infra.) However, if there
were only a limited time left in which to make the levy under local law, and the notice
was not filed within that time, then the lien might be invalidated under § 67c(1) (B)
if it is held to be a statutory lien.
Oldden v. Tonto Realty Corp., 143 F.2d 916, 922 (2d Cir. 1944) (dissenting opin-
ion).
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section 70." And it has been held that a statutory lien may be vul-
nerable under section 70c despite the provisions of section 67b. 6
Furthermore, the new provisions of section 67c(1) (B) expressly recog-
nize this overriding effect of section 70c. Therefore we are only talking
about statutory liens which are valid against an attaching, execution
or judgment creditor at the date of bankruptcy. With this in mind,
we will examine the three clauses of the new section 67c(1).
A. Liens Arising Upon Insolvency
The first clause purports to invalidate any lien "which first becomes
effective" upon (1) insolvency of the debtor; or (2) distribution or
liquidation of his property; or (3) execution against his property
levied at the instance of one other than the lienor. This clause was
apparently aimed primarily at certain wage liens which have been
provided by state law in assignment or insolvency proceedings.5 7 The
statutes typically do not specify in so many words when such liens
"first become effective"; but since they are applicable only in the
assignment or insolvency proceeding and are clearly not intended to
have any effect prior thereto, the most reasonable interpretation is
that they "become effective" when the assignment is made or the
insolvency proceeding is commenced. Strangely enough, this event is
not specified in this clause. Certainly, such liens do not become effec-
tive upon "insolvency" simpliciter55 Nor is it a reasonable interpre-
"'United States v. Speers, 382 U.S. 266 (1965); Aviation Investments, Inc. v.
Cameron, 350 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1965); Rochelle v. McLendon, 208 F.2d 442 (5th Cir.
1953) ; see 4 COLLIER 283-86.
' CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1204 (1955) (see In re West Beverly Corp., 166 F.2d 429
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 820 (1948) ; DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 300 (1953), tit.
10, § 4935 (1953) ; MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 254, § 31 (1965) ; MONT. REV. CODE §§ 45-
601, -607 (semble) (1947); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 51-8-20, -21 (1953); OLA. STAT.
ANN., tit. 42, § 40 (Supp. 1966), § 41 (1954) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 223 (1964).
" Even though some of the statutes cited supra note 87 are phrased merely in
terms of "insolvency," for example, the Delaware statute, they are interpreted to apply
only in insolvency proceedings. Lupton v. Hughes, 2 Penne. [Del.] 515, 47 At. 624
(1900). Compare the similar interpretation given to the federal priority statute,
REv. STAT. § 3466 (1875), 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1954). See Blair, The Priority of the
United States in Equity Receiverships, 39 HARv. L. Rv. 1, 3-4 (1925).
There are certain rights given to a buyer or seller under Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code which arise upon insolvency. For example, under UCC § 2-502 a
buyer may under certain conditions recover goods which have been identified to the
contract "if the seller becomes insolvent within ten days after receipt of the first
installment on their price"; under UCC § 2-702 a seller may under certain conditions
recover goods sold on credit which are received by a buyer "while insolvent"; and
under UCC § 2-705 an unpaid seller may stop goods in transit when "he discovers the
buyer to be insolvent." These rights, however, would not seem to be "liens" within
the meaning of Bankruptcy Act § 67c(1). Although the point may be arguable, since
there is no definition of "lien" in the new Section 1 (29a) of the Bankruptcy Act but
only of "statutory", it is very doubtful that the draftsmen intended to void these
rights under Article 2 of the UCC in bankruptcy. (They may, of course, be otherwise
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tation of these lien statutes to say that the lien becomes effective only
upon liquidation of the property. Rather, since the assignee or re-
ceiver must as a practical matter have at least the implied authority to
sell the property free of the lien, the lien is terminated at that point, as
to the original property, and attaches only to the proceeds. And the
distribution of such proceeds discharges the lien; it certainly does not
create it. However, a court should reach the reasonable conclusion
that these inept expressions are intended to refer to a lien which is only
effective in insolvency proceedings and not prior to their institution.
Even if a state statute purported to make such a lien effective upon
the institution of bankruptcy proceedings, it seems quite clear that it
would be invalid against the trustee under section 70c.19 Therefore,
this provision assumes importance only where there is a state insol-
vency proceeding later superseded by bankruptcy.
The reference to a lien which first becomes effective "upon execution
against... [the debtor's] property levied at the instance of one other
than the lienor" is also apparently directed at certain statutory wage
liens which might be called "piggy-back" liens. These statutes pro-
vide that where an execution is levied upon the property of a debtor by
a creditor, an unpaid employee by filing a notice in the execution
proceedings can obtain a prior right to the payment of a certain portion
of the proceeds of the sale of the property levied upon." While these
liens probably do not become effective upon the levy of execution by
the third party, but only upon the filing of notice by the wage claim-
ant, a liberal interpretation of this clause might include them, par-
ticularly since it is difficult to see what else it could be talking about. 1
vulnerable under §§ 70c and 60. See In re Kravitz, 278 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1960) ; Note,
79 -ARv. L. REv. 598 (1966)).
Note 81 supra.
CoLo. REv. STAT. §§ 80-16-1 to -3 (1963); CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 1206 (1955);
IDAHO CODE ANN. §45-603 (1947); Iw. ANN. STAT. §40-111 (1965); IOwA CODE
ANN. §§ 626.69 - .73 (1950); MiNN. STAT. AN-. §§ 514.59-.60 (1947); Mo. ANN. STAT.§513.055 (1952); MONT. REv. CODE §§ 45-604 to -608 (1947); NEV. REv. STAT.
§ 100.020 (1957); ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 652.510-.560 (1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43.§§221, 222 (1964); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 34-8-1 to -3 (1953); WASH. REv. CODE
§ 49.56.030 (1962). Most of these statutes are not phrased in terms of a "lien", al-
though a few of them are, but rather in terms of a prior right to payment out of the
property levied upon by the other creditor. However, if it is said that they establish
only a "priority," it is a "priority over a lien" and therefore seemingly partakes of
the character of a lien (or at least is sui generis). Compare, however, the interpreta-
tion of the statute of 8 Anne referred to in note 91 infra.
"The statute of 8 Anne c. 14, § 1 (1709), which is in force in some states (see,
e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN., § 2A :42-1 (1952)), gives a landlord a prior right to be paid
his accrued rent, not to exceed one year's rent, before another creditor may remove
goods of the tenant upon the demised premises seized upon execution. However,
"That statute has been generally interpreted to give merely a priority to the landlord,
as distinguished from a lien.... " 4 COLLIER 230-31. Even if this right were inter-
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Presumably, if the execution lien, to which the "piggy-back" lien
fastens, is itself vulnerable under section 67a (because obtained within
four months of bankruptcy while the debtor is insolvent), the "piggy-
back" lien would fall also, either on the theory that it is dependent
upon the validity of the execution lien or that it is itself a "lien ob-
tained by legal or equitable process or proceedings." If this is true,
then only where the execution lien is invulnerable will this new pro-
vision of section 67c(1) (A) have any significance. Were it not for the
preservation provisions of section 67c(2), 92 the only result of invali-
dating the "piggy-back" lien would be to benefit the holder of the
execution lien; however, under those provisions the trustee can pre-
serve the wage lien for the benefit of the bankrupt's estate. He may
thereby be able to pick up some small amounts for the estate in a few
cases, where he would have gotten nothing if the wage lien had never
been asserted in the execution proceeding.
B. Liens Invalid Against a Bona Fide Purchaser
Clause (B) of section 67c(1) purports to invalidate every statutory
lien which is not valid as against a bona fide purchaser at the date of
bankruptcy; but it then provides that any such lien which can be
perfected against such a purchaser under applicable lien law may be
perfected after bankruptcy and then becomes valid as against the
trustee. Therefore, this clause contemplates a statutory lien which:
(a) is valid as against an attaching, execution or judgment creditor at
the date of bankruptcy (since otherwise section 70c invalidates it and
section 67c is irrelevant); (b) is not valid as against a bona fide pur-
chaser at the date of bankruptcy; (c) cannot be made valid as against
preted to be a lien, it would be covered by the new 67c(1)(C) invalidating all land-
lords' liens, and it would be unnecessary to invoke § 67c(1) (A).
" "The court may, on due notice, order any of the aforesaid liens invalidated
against the trustee to be preserved for the benefit of the estate and in that event the
lien shall pass to the trustee. A lien not preserved for the benefit of the estate but
invalidated against the trustee shall be invalid as against all liens indefeasible in
bankruptcy, so as to have the effect of promoting liens indefeasible in bankruptcy
which would otherwise be subordinate to such invalidated lien. Claims for wages,
taxes, and rent secured by liens hereby invalidated or preserved shall be respectively
allowable with priority and restricted as are debts therefor entitled to priority under
clauses (2), (4), and (5) of subdivision a of section 64 of this Act, even though not
otherwise granted priority."
What circumstance the second sentence of this clause contemplates is mysterious,
since it would always be to the advantage of the estate to preserve the invalidated lien
if it were prior to some other lien indefeasible in bankruptcy; and it would seem that
the trustee could be surcharged if he failed to take action to do this.
See text at note 54 supra, for comment on the third sentence of this provision as it
relates to wage and tax claims. (The third sentence does serve some function insofar
as it relates to rent claims, since they are not given priority by § 64a itself but by
state law incorporated into § 64a(5). See text following note 96 infra.)
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a bona fide purchaser by any action of the lienor; and (d) is still en-
forceable under state law.
It might also apply in some cases where the lien could be made
valid against a bona fide purchaser after bankruptcy, but under state
law the lienor has only a limited time in which to do this and he fails to
take action within that time; however, this situation would normally
only arise through negligence of the lienor in failing to take action to
protect his rights.
What actual statutory liens are described by section 67c(1)(B)?
There are, of course, many liens which are valid as against an attach-
ing creditor but not a bona fide purchaser. An unrecorded real prop-
erty mortgage, while not a statutory lien, is in this category in many
states.9 3 However, a lien which cannot by any means be perfected as
against a bona fide purchaser, not even by seizure of the property sub-
ject to the lien, is virtually inconceivable. 4
"'OsBORNE, MORTGAGES §§ 196, 210 (1951).
"
4Under N.Y. Civ. PRAc. § 5202(a) (1963) the lien of a writ of execution, even
after levy, is not good as against a bona fide purchaser in the case of debts and per-
sonal property "not capable of delivery." Apparently such a lien in the case of debts
could never be perfected as against a bona fide purchaser, except by collection of the
debt, which would extinguish the debt and the lien on it. The same situation appar-
ently exists in Virginia, where the lien of a fi. fa. attaches not only to the property
levied upon, but also to all other personal estate of the judgment debtor "not capable
of being levied on," but such lien is not valid as against an "assignee... for valuable
consideration... unless he has notice thereof." VA. CODE ANN. § 8-431 (1950). A
"suggestion" of garnishment may be made, which eventually may result in a judgment
against the obligor on the debt; but apparently the service upon the garnishee creates
no additional lien upon the debt. Nor is there any indication that such service upon
the garnishee would perfect the lien of the fi. fa. as against a bona fide assignee.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8-441 (1950). However, these are "judicial," not "statutory," liens.
See text following note 83 supra.
In Florida there is a repairer's lien (FLA. STAT. § 85.25 (1963)) and in Oregon a
landlord's lien (ORE. REv. STAT. § 87.535 (1953)) which are not valid against either
a bona fide purchaser or a lien creditor, but these liens are invalidated anyway by § 70c
(Aviation Investments, Inc. v. Cameron, 350 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1965)), and the Oregon
landlord's lien in addition by § 67c(1) (C). Furthermore, they can be perfected against
a bona fide purchaser by the lienor taking possession.
In Georgia there is a laborer's lien and in New Jersey a garage keeper's lien
which are not valid against a bona fide purchaser so long as non-possessory, GA. CODE
ANN. § 67-1803 (1933) ; N.J. STAT. ANN., §§ 2A :44-21 (Supp. 1966), 2A :44-22 (1952) ;
Lanterman v. Luby, 96 N.J.L. 255, 114 Atl. 325 (1921), but in both cases they can be
perfected by the lienor taking possession.
In Illinois there is a thresherman's lien upon the crops threshed which is not valid
as against a purchaser unless the lienor serves a written notice of the existence of the
lien upon such purchaser "previous to or at the time of making final settlement for
such crops." ILL. STAT. ANN., ch. 82, § 59a (1966). Query as to whether the service
of such a notice upon the trustee after bankruptcy would perfect the lien under§ 67c(1) (B) ?
In Pennsylvania a mechanic's lien on an improvement on real property continues
on the improvement if it is unlawfully removed, but is not valid against a "purchaser
for value." PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 49, § 1307 (1965). In Colorado the lien on the "get"
of "bulls, rams and boars" is not valid against a bona fide purchaser, COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 8-9-8 to -9 (1963) (although the lien on the get of stallions and jacks is,
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-9-7 (1963)). In neither case is there any express statutory
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How did this strange provision get into the amendment? It clearly
resulted from transposing a proviso formerly in a validating provision
to a new invalidating provision, with the result that the proviso vali-
dates substantially the same liens that the basic provision purports to
invalidate. Former section 67b generally validated statutory liens in
bankruptcy, and it contained a sentence in the nature of a proviso
stating:
Where by such laws [creating the statutory lien] such liens are required
to be perfected and arise but are not perfected before bankruptcy, they
may nevertheless be valid, if perfected within the time permitted by and
in accordance with the requirements of such laws, except that if such
laws require the liens to be perfected by the seizure of the property, they
shall instead be perfected by filing notice thereof with the court.
Former section 67c(1), which was also added in the Chandler Act,
cut across this provision by subordinating certain statutory liens on
personal property not accompanied by possession; section 67c(2),
added in 1952, further modified it by invalidating certain statutory
liens on personal property not accompanied by possession, levy, se-
questration or distraint. These former provisions of section 67c, while
they modified the basic validating provision, were nevertheless per-
fectly consistent with it since the invalidating cause had nothing to do
with perfection or lack thereof.
In the new statute, the proviso was removed from the validating
provision, section 67b, and was instead inserted (with some minor
modifications of language) into section 67c(1) (B) adopting an en-
tirely new invalidating principle, i.e., lack of perfection as against a
bona fide purchaser.5 The result is that the proviso appears to nega-
tive the basic provision; the new section 67c(1) (B) means, for all
practical purposes, nothing.
C. Landlords' Liens
If the first clause of section 67c(1) is of minor importance and the
second clause is self-stultifying, the third clause strikes with a ven-
geance at one particular category of liens-landlords' liens. These
method of perfection available. Is it possible that the Congress of the United States
drew itself up in all its majesty and legislated only against liens on ambulatory
houses in Pennsylvania and the get of bulls, rams and boars in Colorado?
(This note is based upon a survey of the law of the same sixteen states referred to
in note 58 supra.)
0H.R. Ra. No. 686, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1965). "In the interest of clarity
the substance of the last sentence of subdivision b has been deleted and instead
inserted as a proviso in Section 67c(1) (B)." In the interest of clarity!?
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liens were already treated with peculiar discrimination in the former
provisions of section 67c. They were not, it is true, invalidated under
clause (2) of that section unless they were statutory liens and unless
they were not accompanied by possession, levy, sequestration or dis-
traint; or, in other words, they were treated in that clause like all
other statutory liens. However, under clause (1) of that section all
liens of "distress for rent" were subordinated to the first two priorities
of section 64a, whether statutory or not, and whether or not accom-
panied by possession, and furthermore were restricted in amount to
the rent allowed priority under section 64a(5).
Under the new provisions of section 67c(1) (C) every "statutory
lien for rent" and every "lien of distress for rent, whether statutory or
not" are invalidated. This differs from the previous provisions pri-
marily in that: (a) a statutory lien for rent is invalidated even
though accompanied by possession, levy, sequestration or distraint;
and (b) a common-law "lien of distress for rent," whether or not
accompanied by possession, is invalidated, rather than merely subor-
dinated to the first two priorities in section 64a and restricted in
amount.96
However, new section 67c(2) provides that where a lien for rent is
invalidated under section 67c(1) (or preserved for the benefit of the
estate), the claim secured by the invalidated lien shall be "allowable
with priority and restricted as are debts therefor entitled to priority
under... [clause] (5) of subdivision a of section 64 of this Act, even
though not otherwise granted priority." Section 64a(5) recognizes a
state priority in favor of a landlord (on the fifth rung of the five-rung
ladder of priority), but restricted to rent due for the actual use and
occupancy of the premises accrued during the three months preceding
bankruptcy. Therefore, if state law should purport to grant a lien to a
landlord under certain circumstances, but not any "priority," the lien,
although invalidated by section 67c(1) (C), will be treated as though
it granted a priority and will be recognized as such to the extent per-
mitted by section 64a(5).
The second sentence of the new section 67c(1) (C) provides that a
"right of distress for rent which creates a security interest in property
shall be deemed a lien for the purposes of this subdivision c." What
did the authors of this curious sentence have in mind? The use of the
phrase "security interest" suggests that perhaps it was intended to
" See note 73 supra, for one situation where a landlord's lien apparently escaped
through the interstices of former §§ 67c(1) & 67c(2).
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invalidate in bankruptcy any chattel mortgage or other security given
by a tenant to his landlord to secure the payment of rent. Aside from
the startling nature of such a proposition, this thought could certainly
have been expressed more clearly if that was what was intended. A
security interest under the Uniform Commercial Code may give to the
secured party a right of self-help similar to a "right of distress" in that
the secured party may peaceably take possession of the collateral to
enforce his security interest.9 7 But this right does not create the
security interest; the security interest creates the right. The security
interest is created by an agreement of the parties. 8
On the other hand, if we reject this interpretation, what does the
sentence mean? If it is suggested that it refers to something like the
common-law "right of distress" for rent, then the reply can be made
that such a right does not create any "security interest," certainly not
in the sense used in the Uniform Commercial Code since that deals
only with liens created by an agreement of the parties. Furthermore,
any such common-law right of distress for rent is invalidated already
by the first sentence of section 67c(1) (C); the second sentence would
seem to be superfluous under this interpretation. However, there may
have been some thought that the phrase in the first sentence, "lien of
distress," would imply that the landlord must actually have made a
distraint in order for the lien to be invalidated under that provision;
whereas, the lien might arise prior to such action by virtue of the right
of distress.9 In other words, the intent was to invalidate any "lien of
distress for rent, whether arising before or upon exercise of the right of
distress, and whether common law or statutory." Why this wasn't said
if it was meant is a small mystery. And why the misleading phrase
"security interest" was introduced into the second sentence is a greater
one. Perhaps the draftsmen were afraid that, if the second sentence
said that a right of distress which creates a lien or is a lien shall be
"deemed" a lien, it would sound like Gertrude Stein.
.7 UCC § 9-503.
" Aside from the fact that if Congress meant to invalidate any security interest
securing the payment of rent it could easily have said so, such a singling out of
landlords as the only creditors of a bankrupt who are prohibited from taking security
for their claims would be outrageous. It is true that claims for fidure rent present a
peculiar problem and have been restricted by § 64a(9) to an amount not exceeding the
rent reserved for one year, without acceleration. The second circuit has suggested
that this provision would invalidate any security obtained by the landlord in excess
of the allowable amount. Oldden v. Tonto Realty Corp., 143 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1944)
(This is the decision which provoked Jerome Frank's remark about "Henry Georgian
anmosity" towards landlords, quoted at note 85 supra.) But the provision we are
considering is not limited to future rent; it applies to all rent, including that accrued
and unpaid at the date of bankruptcy.
14 COLLIER 230.
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There is another interpretation of this sentence which (although
the most ridiculous) seems upon reflection the most probable ex-
planation of the intent of the draftsmen. Collier argued that a right of
distress given to a landlord by contract in the lease, even though
properly perfected as a contractual lien under local law, would be
subordinated by the old section 67c(1).00 The cases cited by Collier
did not support this argument; 101 it rested merely upon a mechanistic
interpretation of the phrase "statutory or otherwise." It may be that
the sentence under consideration is now intended to prescribe this
result. This would mean that the landlord who got two pieces of paper,
one labelled "lease" and the other "chattel mortgage," and who prop-
erly filed a financing statement under the UCC, would have a valid
lien on the personal property of his tenant; whereas, if another land-
lord got one piece of paper containing both the lease and a security
agreement, even though he also properly filed, his lien would be in-
validated by section 67c(1) (C), at least if he used that distressful
word "distress." Under this interpretation, if the lease contained a
separate paragraph labelled "mortgage of chattels" and the word
"distress" was avoided, the court would be presented with a nice
problem.
At any rate, this sentence should stand as one more warning, prob-
ably useless in view of the volumes of such warnings in the past which
have gone unheeded, that a statutory draftsman should never-repeat,
never-use the technique of saying that one thing shall be "deemed"
something else.
In the light of this discussion, what are the major differences be-
tween the provisions of the new section 67c(1) and the provisions of
the old section 67c so far as non-tax statutory liens and landlords'
common-law liens are concerned? They appear to be the following:
(a) The new provisions cover liens on real as well as personal prop-
erty.
(b) The new provisions cover liens created by federal as well as
state law.102
'
0
"Id. at 293.
Iot In the footnote to this statement in COLIER all of the decided cases are either
distinguished, or it is explained that they would "go the other way" under the
Chandler Act. No affirmative authority whatever is cited for the statement.
In re King Furniture City, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 453, 457 (E.D. Ark. 1965), while
invalidating such a lien for lack of proper filing under the Uniform Commercial
Code, denied that it was subject to former § 67c. Strangely enough, however, it was
the landlord, not the trustee, who was invoking § 67c, asserting that it gave him
"priority." Where he got this notion, it is impossible to imagine.
"'The subordination provisions of former § 67c(1) covered federal statutory liens,
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(c) The subordination of such liens has been eliminated; they are
now invalidated or wholly valid.
(d) The new provisions clearly are intended to invalidate all land-
lords' liens, whether statutory or common law and whether or not ac-
companied by possession, levy, sequestration or distraint; whereas,
previously some such liens were merely subordinated to the first two
priorities. However, such subordinated landlords' liens were formerly
restricted to the amount of rent granted priority under section 64a(5)
(i.e., an amount equal to three months' rent); and under the new pro-
visions an invalidated lien is to be treated as though it were a priority.
Therefore, the only effect of this change is to demote such claims from
position two and one-half to position five on the ladder of priorities." 3
(e) The basis for invalidating statutory liens, other than landlords'
liens, is no longer lack of possession, but rather the two tests of section
67c(1) (A) and (B) which have been discussed at length above.
The most important of these changes is the last one which shifts the
basis of invalidation from the relatively simple test of possession of
personal property (or levy, sequestration or distraint) to the more
difficult and much less widely applicable tests of whether the lien
"first becomes effective" upon insolvency, etc., or whether it is invalid
as against a bona fide purchaser and cannot be made valid against one.
It is safe to predict that the new provisions will invalidate many fewer
statutory liens than the previous provisions; but where they do in-
validate a general statutory lien, they will strike it down with respect to
real property as well as personal property.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
When one has worked his way through this labyrinth of language,
which is truly one of the labors of Hercules, what is the general picture,
if any, which emerges as to the effect of the 1966 amendments to the
Bankruptcy Act? The reader may have observed that little has been
said as to the policy considerations bearing upon the various problems
discussed. Indeed, it seems almost ill-mannered to mention such things
in the presence of these delightfully complicated provisions, which curl
upon themselves like a crocodile swallowing its own tail. Nevertheless,
it is useful to isolate a few relatively simple questions with which
these amendments purportedly deal.
but not the invalidation provisions of former § 67c(2). There would seem to be few fed-
eral statutory liens of economic importance, other than tax liens. Federal tax liens will
not be invalidated by the new § 67c(1), whether they are covered by it or not. See
text at notes 51-53 supra.
" One exception to this statement is pointed out in note 73 supra.
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Should tax liens (other than liens for ad valorem taxes) be recog-
nized in bankruptcy? It may be assumed that tax liens are necessary
outside of bankruptcy for the efficient collection of the revenue and
for the purpose of protecting the Government against subsequent pur-
chasers and secured parties (after appropriate notice of the tax lien is
given). Also, the Government's position vis-h-vis other unsecured cred-
itors must be established in the race of diligence which characterizes
ordinary collection remedies, and a convenient point at which to do
this is when the tax lien attaches. Whether the unsecured creditors
should also be entitled to notice is a separate question. On the other
hand, in insolvency proceedings none of this is relevant. Priorities are
established by the statute; the Government no longer needs any collec-
tion procedure or any protection against subsequent parties. To say
that an income tax claim should be entitled to the super priority of a
secured debt simply because it has been assessed the day before bank-
ruptcy, but that the same tax claim should be demoted to a fourth
priority if it is assessed the day after bankruptcy, is irrational. This
factor has nothing to do either with the equities of the situation or with
the needs of the fisc.
Should the filing or non-filing of a notice determine the recognition
of tax liens in bankruptcy? A federal tax lien as to which notice has
been filed is recognized in bankruptcy, but with respect to personal
property is subordinated by section 67c to the first two priorities if
not accompanied by possession. Under the Speers case and the amend-
ment to section 70c, however, a federal tax lien with respect to which
no notice has been filed is not recognized in bankruptcy, whether or not
accompanied by possession, and is granted only a fourth priority with
respect to both real and personal property (except in a few instances
under amended section 64a where it is granted no priority). Putting
aside for the moment the question whether some tax claims should be
denied any priority, why should the filing of the notice have this
effect?
The effect of this decision and amendment is that such an unper-
fected tax lien is subordinated to administrative expenses and wage
claims and required to share equally with other tax claims not secured
by a lien; whereas, if the notice had been filed it would have been
superior to such other tax claims and, in the case of personal property
accompanied by possession or real property, superior to the admin-
istrative expenses and wage claims. Which of these people are going
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to check the files for federal tax liens? The claimants of administra-
tive expenses only come into existence after the filing of the petition,
so that it is literally impossible for the filing or non-filing of the notice
prior thereto to have any meaning so far as they are concerned. Wage
claimants could, but it is safe to say never do, check the files for
notices of federal tax liens before contributing their services to the
enterprise. While state tax collectors might for some reason check the
notices of federal tax liens, they are certainly not going to abstain
from assessing their own taxes simply because the taxpayer also owes
money to the federal government. Therefore, the priority of these
claimants is made to turn upon a factor which is wholly irrelevant to
them. And to the extent that the rule puts pressure upon the Internal
Revenue Service to file many more notices of tax liens it may have
undesirable collateral consequences.
Should tax claims be granted priority in bankruptcy? Does the
traditional rule which has granted priority to all tax claims, at least
over all general, non-priority creditors, rest upon anything more than
a naked assertion of power based upon the fact that this particular
creditor happens to be writing the rules of distribution? It is possible
that in a simpler day the priority given to tax claims in insolvency
proceedings was of some real consequence in gathering together enough
funds to keep the government running. There can be no doubt today
that whatever amount the government is able to collect as a result of
such a priority over what it would receive without it is insignificant; 04
its sacrifice would go completely unnoticed in the vast federal bureau-
cracy. It is difficult to see how the government, absent a plea of
necessity, has any equities superior to the other creditors of an in-
solvent.
It may be argued, since general, non-priority creditors already re-
ceive so little in a bankruptcy liquidation, and would receive such a
"In the fiscal year ended June 30, 1966, the total amount paid on priority tax
claims (both state and federal) in all bankruptcy proceedings was $11,224,590 and the
total amount paid to all secured creditors who filed proofs of claims was $32,427,785.
Tables of Bankruptcy Statistics for the Fiscal Year ended June 30, 1966, Table F 5(Adm. Off. U.S. Courts 1967). Of course, most secured creditors realize on their
collateral outside of the bankruptcy administration; but a tax lien which is a general,
floating lien on all of the property of the bankrupt usually is liquidated in the bank-
ruptcy proceedings and ad valorem taxes are also usually paid in such proceedings
unless the trustee abandons the property. Therefore, this $32,427,785 probably includes
the amount realized on almost all tax liens, as well as a substantial amount paid on
other secured debts. Hence, all tax claims, liened and unliened, probably received sub-
stantially less than $43,000,000 in that year in bankruptcy liquidations, despite their
liens and priorities. In the days of $100 billion budgets, this is an insignificant
amount.
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small amount more if the priority of tax claims were denied, that the
question is of no real economic importance to them either. Therefore,
the priority should be maintained so that a substantial amount of
money, even though admittedly small in relation to the over-all bud-
get, will go to the government where it may be used for the benefit of
all citizens, rather than be scattered about in insignificant amounts
among a large number of unsecured creditors. However, it is important
not only that the Government be fair in its dealings with its citizens,
but that it appear to be fair, in this area as well as others. If there is no
equitable basis for the Government's claiming such a priority, its asser-
tion is viewed merely as an exercise of arbitrary power; to say that any
one of the victims is really hurt very little is irrelevant. Even the
ineffectual legislation represented by these amendments could never
have been enacted in the absence of a widespread and deep-seated
resentment in the business community at the government's claiming
the lion's share of every bankrupt estate.-'
If some tax claims are to be granted priority, but not others, upon
what basis should the selection be made? The answer that the tax
claims to be denied priority should be selected on the basis of age is
at first sight appealing, and it was adopted in the amended section
64a (before its stultification by the various provisos). However, a
little closer analysis would have revealed that this answer is not very
satisfactory. There are two major reasons why a tax claim may go
uncollected for a long period of time. One is simply the delay, neg-
ligence or procrastination of the tax collector. The other is a con-
sideration for the taxpayer and the withholding of drastic measures
because of a recognition that his default is not willful and that he is in
good faith attempting to remedy it. Any rule denying priority to tax
claims purely upon the basis of age tends to put pressure on the
Internal Revenue Service to "crack down" on delinquent taxpayers,
regardless of their degree of fault. Surely, any humanity which may
have insinuated itself into the heartless process of tax collection is not
something to be discouraged. Nor should the mere fact of delay nec-
essarily be viewed as indicating any lack of diligence on the part of
the Internal Revenue Service, or as indicating any lack of "virtue" in
the claim itself as compared with one more recent. Under present
'5 See H.. RtP. No. 687, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1965) ("The committee has
received hundreds of letters from business firms all over the country complaining
about this situation.") ; Hearing 43-44, 46, 48, 56.
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conditions, with the millions of returns that must be handled, it is
frequently impossible for the Internal Revenue Service (absent a vast
increase in personnel) to audit a return and determine a deficiency,
giving the taxpayer every opportunity to present his case, in less than
four or five years.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to formulate a rule which segregates
those tax claims that are not "deserving" of priority on the basis of
age, unless a determination is made in each case whether the govern-
ment was somehow at fault in not proceeding sooner (which is not a
feasible administrative task). If it is necessary in this connection to
make a Solomonic decision because of political considerations, it would
be preferable to limit the priority of tax claims to a certain percentage
of the assets available for distribution at that level of priority, and to
require them to share with general creditors as to the balance. While
this is not exactly a rational solution, it is certainly more so than what
is now embodied in section 64a(4), and it has the advantage of not
purporting to be anything other than a political compromise.
Should any tax claims be discharged in bankruptcy, and, if so, which
ones? The proponents of the amendments argued that a business con-
ducted through a corporation can go under without any surviving lia-
bility of its shareholders for unpaid taxes; and that individuals and
partnerships who do not or cannot incorporate their businesses should
not be denied the same right as the owner of a corporation to a fresh
start."' This argument applies only to the individual or partnership in
a business or profession, not to the wage earner; however, because of
the withholding provisions it is doubtful if unpaid taxes are of any real
significance in connection with personal bankruptcies. They would be
involved in only a few cases as a result of under-withholding. This
argument, based only upon the alleged inconsistency of treatment, does
not really address itself to the basic question whether taxes should or
should not be discharged.
A more forceful argument is that the government should be at least
as generous towards those who have experienced a financial failure as
it requires others to be. Acceptance of this argument would not mean
that certain tax claims could not be excepted from the effect of the
discharge where the taxpayer is guilty of some fault under the revenue
laws putting him in a special category; e.g., where he files no return,
or where he files a fraudulent return, or where he omits from the
'H.R. REP. No. 637, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1965); S. REP. No. 114, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. 12 (1965).
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return more than twenty-five per cent of his gross income. Such treat-
ment of tax claims would be consistent with the treatment of the
claims of other creditors, since other claims based upon fraud or mis-
representation or upon willful injury to person or property are ex-
cluded from the effect of a discharge.10 7
On the other hand, granting a discharge to any tax claims may tend
to influence the Internal Revenue Service to be less lenient with tax-
payers in permitting installment payments of taxes or deficiencies.
If the taxpayer can at any time discharge the unpaid installments by
going into bankruptcy, and if there exist substantial assets, the gov-
ernment may prefer to take what it can get now rather than gamble
upon those assets being dissipated and later ending up with nothing.'
However, is this not precisely the judgment that the Internal Revenue
Service must and should make in any case where it agrees to such an
arrangement, even under the previous law? The Service might be
slightly more willing to go along if a subsequent bankruptcy would not
wipe out the tax claim; but a subsequent bankruptcy is going to make
the claim very difficult to collect in any event. The fact that the Ser-
vice previously has made such arrangements with corporations as well
as individuals shows that a possible future discharge is not the sole
determining factor.
Should statutory liens be invalidated in bankruptcy? The Bank-
ruptcy Act has for some time exhibited a highly ambivalent attitude
towards statutory liens. This attitude arises out of the inherent con-
tradiction in the Chandler Act's treatment of state laws favoring cer-
tain groups of creditors over others. That act eliminated recognition
in bankruptcy of state-created priorities in section 64a, except for a
limited recognition of a state priority in favor of a landlord in clause
(5) 109 At the same time, that act in section 67b generally validated all
state "statutory liens" in favor of "classes of persons."" 0 Since the
only function of such a lien in bankruptcy is to give priority to the
person in whose favor it is created, it is impossible to reconcile the
'10 Bankruptcy Act, § 17a(2).
"If the payment period extends beyond the three-year limitation proposed in
H.R. 4473 [a precedessor bill to H.R. 3438] it would require the Service to take a risk
as to whether the Government would ever receive payment. Therefore, if a taxpayer
is in possession of a home or other valuable asset, the Service would in all probabil-
ity be required, in order to protect the revenue, to make immediate seizure of the
home or other assets rather than enter into any extended payment plan." Letter From
Stanley S. Surrey, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, H.R. RP. No. 687, 89 Cong.,
1st Sess. 6 (1965).
' 3 COLLIER 2053-54.14 COLLIER 178-88.
[ VOL. 42: 681
BANKRUPTCY ACT AMENDIENTS OF 1966
policy of section 64a with that of section 67b. All that a state had to do
to grant special treatment to favored creditors in bankruptcy was to
create a "lien" rather than a "priority." The differences between a
general floating lien on all the property of a debtor and a priority are
practically undetectable, at least as far as bankruptcy administration
is concerned.
This basic inconsistency was recognized from the outset, since the
Chandler Act, after generally validating state statutory liens in section
67b, then in section 67c subordinated such liens to the first two
priorities in section 64a, but only with respect to personal property
and only if the liens were not accompanied by possession. This was
followed by the addition of section 67c(2) in 1952 and by the entire
re-writing of section 67c in 1966, still without solving this inherent
contradiction. It would be perfectly easy to write a state statute grant-
ing a general "lien" to wage earners, for example, which would neatly
sidestep all of the little traps laid in the new section 67c(1) and
which would be payable first as a secured debt, since it is no longer
subordinated by section 67c(3) in any event.
Since someone will probably challenge me to make good this boast,
I will do so:
All unpaid wages shall constitute a lien upon all of the property of the
employer, real and personal, then owned or thereafter acquired, arising
at the date such wages are due. Such lien shall be valid against subse-
quent attaching, execution and judgment creditors; but it shall terminate
upon any sale on execution or other judicial process, unless the lienor
has previously recorded a notice of the lien and in the case of personal
property has made a third party claim in the execution proceedings.
Such lien shall be invalid as against any subsequent purchaser, encum-
brancer or secured party, unless prior to such purchase, encumbrance or
secured transaction the lienor has recorded a notice of the lien. The
notice of lien referred to in this paragraph must state the name of the
claimant, the amount of his claim, the name of the employer, and must
describe the property upon which the lien is claimed with particularity,
in the case of real property by metes and bounds or other legal des-
cription and in the case of personal property specifically item by item
with the serial numbers or other identifying marks to the extent that the
property is reasonably capable of such description.
The exact place of filing or recording the notice and other details would
of course have to be worked out in each state. However, it is safe to
predict that almost no employee would ever record such a notice prior
to insolvency proceedings; but in insolvency proceedings it could easily
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be filed on behalf of all wage claimants. And it would not be subject
to any of the infirmities presently denounced in section 67c(1).
The only way to solve this problem of statutory liens is by frankly
recognizing that this contradiction exists and insisting that the Bank-
ruptcy Act control priorities, except where Congress is willing to sur-
render this right to the states; or, in other words, by providing that
all state statutory liens are invalid in bankruptcy, with specific excep-
tions.
Such exceptions should relate to statutory liens which are universal
or virtually so among the states and for which Congress would have to
provide some substitute if they were invalidated. I am thinking in
particular of mechanics' liens given to contractors, subcontractors,
workmen and materialmen in connection with a work of improvement
on real property. Whatever one may think of such liens, there can be
no doubt that the construction industry has developed in such reliance
upon them that it would be unthinkable to propose that they be
abolished in bankruptcy. And I do not believe that Congress is pre-
pared to enact a national mechanics' lien law in the Bankruptcy Act;
I would certainly not advise it to try."' Probably artisans' liens and
warehousemen's and carriers' liens fall in the same category. These
might be described in general terms as liens upon specific personal
property based upon services rendered upon or with respect to such
property. Whether possession by the lienor should be required at the
date of bankruptcy is a question which would have to be considered,
since some such liens may continue despite the surrender of posses-
sion;"' and also whether any general lien in favor of such persons
(e.g., in favor of a warehouseman for storage charges on other prop-
erty)" 3 should be preserved or not. Whichever ones are selected as
deserving of preservation, they could be specifically excepted from the
general invalidation provision.
The faithful reader may inquire what these "conclusions" (or any
similar basic policy considerations) have to do with the 1966 amend-
ments to the Bankruptcy Act. He will have taken my point. These
amendments represent a very undesirable form of tinkering with the
' This is not simply a generalized observation, but a cri die coeur arising from
the author's recent experience in trying unsuccessfully for almost two years to rewrite
the California mechanics' lien law in such a way as to satisfy all of the divergent
interests represented on a Citizens' Committee to Study the Mechanics' Lien Law
appointed by the California Legislature.
"
2 BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 121 (2d ed. 1955); 1 JoNEs, LiENs §§ 22, 749
(3d ed. 1914).
. See UCC § 7-209(1).
[ VOL. 42 :681
BANKRUPTCY ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1966
language of the Bankruptcy Act, with nobody being willing to ask the
gut questions, or at least able to answer them. The amendments have
corrected an undesirable situation existing in one circuit, which prob-
ably would have resolved itself in time anyway; they have confirmed
a Supreme Court decision which was probably ill-advised; they have
perhaps granted a discharge with respect to some tax claims; and
otherwise they have further complicated an already intolerably com-
plicated statute. The final conclusion must be that whatever good
they may do is not worth the mess they have made.1 4
I" Back to the old drawing board I
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